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I. INTRODUCTION 
The picture of dispersed, isolated and uninterested shareholders so graphically drawn by 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 19321 is for the most part no longer accurate in today's 
market, although their famous observations on the separation of control and ownership of 
public corporations remain true.  As Prof. Melvin Eisenberg pointed out as early as 1969,2 
and as the business and academic communities widely discussed during the 1990s,3 financial 
                                               
*  Research Associate, Institute for Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am 
Main, J.D. Georgetown, Ph.D., SUNY at Buffalo, LL.M., University of Frankfurt. The Author would 
like to thank Professors Theodor Baums, Andreas Cahn and Geoffrey Miller for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this article.  
1  ADOLF A. BERLE, GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (revised 
ed., 1968). 
2  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate 
Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 et seq. (1969). 
3  See e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERSITY 507 (A. McCahery, et al. eds., 2002); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The 
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992), John C. Coffee, Liquidity 
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1277 (1991). 
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institutions are increasingly becoming the primary shareholders in American public 
companies.4  This steadily growing concentration of voting power in the hands of 
sophisticated, professional investors has been somewhat haltingly accompanied by measures 
to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights, as well as to ensure that such rights are 
exercised properly.  Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereinafter, the "SEC") and the U.S. Congress took some action to facilitate communication 
with shareholders who held shares indirectly through brokers or banks.5  In 1992, the SEC 
amended its proxy rules to, inter alia, allow shareholders to discuss their voting intentions 
among themselves without triggering a duty to file a proxy statement pursuant to § 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter, the "Exchange Act").6  In 1994, the U.S. 
Department of Labor codified the duty of trustees and investment managers under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to exercise the voting rights attaching to 
pension plan shares pursuant to fiduciary duties.7  Although regulatory reform slowed during 
the bull market of the late 1990s, when in 2001, the slowly leaking tech bubble finally burst 
with the bankruptcy of Enron Corp.,8 erasing about seven trillion dollars in market 
                                               
4  In 1969, Prof. Melvin Eisenberg pointed out that large shareholders were relatively well represented in 
listed companies (see Eisenberg, supra note 2); as of 2001, institutional investors held 55.8% of the 
publicly traded equities in the United States. See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on 
Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 95 (2003). 
5  The relevant measures are found in current Rule 14a-13, 17 CFR § 240.14a-13 (duty of issuer to 
inquire whether registered broker or bank holds for customer shareholders), Rule 14b-1, § 240.14b–1 
(duty of broker or dealer to forward proxy materials to customer shareholders), and Rule 14b-2, § 
240.14b–2 (duty of banks to forward materials).  See the historical description provided in Randall S. 
Thomas & Catherine T. Dixon, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL § 8.02[B] (1998) and Shaun M. Klein, Rule 14b-2: Does it Actually Lead 
to the Prompt Forwarding of Communications to Beneficial Owners of Securities? , J. Corp. L. 155 
(1997). 
6  Perhaps the most important of the amendments was the adjustment of the definition of a "solicitation" 
to exclude certain consultative communications from triggeri ng a duty to file a proxy statement.  See 
Regulation 14A, Solicitation of Proxies, 17 CFR § 240.14a-1 et. seq.  These shareholder 
communication rules are discussed in Steven A. Rosenblum, The Shareholder Communications Proxy 
Rules and Their Practical Effect on Shareholder Activism and Proxy Contests, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 11-4 et. seq. (Amy L. Goodman & John F. Olson, eds., 
2004). 
7  DOL Interpretive bulletin relating to written statements of investment policy, including p roxy voting 
policy or guidelines, 29 CFR § 2509.94–2 (2004). 
8  See John C. Coffee, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s , 89 
CORNELL L.R. 269 (2004); -- Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS LAW 
1403 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371 (2002); Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two 
Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 449 (2002). 
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capitalization,9 public opinion once again swung towards supporting improvements in 
corporate governance.  Lawmakers,10 regulators11 and stock exchanges12 all took action to 
shore up the regulatory and governance framework where necessary.  In 2003, the SEC 
further strengthened shareholder monitoring through institutional investors by requiring 
investment companies to publish their voting policies and their voting records,13 and requiring 
investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures designed to ensure that client 
securities are voted in the best interest of clients, provide clients with information on such 
policies and procedures, and upon request inform them of how votes were actually cast.14  
Also in 2003, the SEC published a proposed rule that would allow shareholders, under certain 
circumstances, to include a limited number of nominees for board positions in the company's 
proxy materials.15 
The debate on measures to empower shareholders inevitably seeks to define the 
appropriate role of shareholders in the governance of public corporations.16  Such efforts 
present an interesting opportunity for the model-shopping function of comparative law.17  The 
                                               
9  This was the approximate amount of market capitalization that the roughly 6,000 companies included 
in the Wilshire 5000 lost between March 24, 2000, when the index stood at 14,751.64 points and July 
23, 2002, when it fell about 48 % to 7,601.84 points in the wake of scandals at numerous listed 
companies.  This data is available at wilshire.com/indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/.  
10  See Pub. L. No. 107-204, July 30, 2002 (H.R. 3763) Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, "An Act to protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for other purposes," which primarily amended the Exchange Act.  
11  Since 2002, the SEC has issued numerous rules to correct abuses and to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, primarily focusing on the quality of disclosure (timeliness, inclusiveness and accuracy), 
accounting (the introduction of a new supervisory entity), and board monitoring (independent audit 
committee, ethics rules, financial expertise). The security holder nominations proposal discussed 
herein would be the latest of these measures.  The proposed and final rules of the SEC for about the last 
10 years are available on its website, www.sec.gov/. 
12  The New York Stock Exchange Inc. and the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., a subsidiary of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), have both substantially revised their corporate governance 
rules in response to this governance breakdown. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Approval of 
Proposed Rule Changes, SEC Release No. 34–48745, 68 Federal Register 64154 (November 12, 2003). 
13  Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, SEC Release Nr. 33–8188, 34–47304, 68 Federal Register 6564 (Feb. 7, 
2003). 
14  Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, SEC Release Nr. IA–2106, 68 Federal Register 
6585 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
15  Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, SEC Release No. 34–48626, 68 Federal 
Register 60784 (October 14, 2003) ("Security Holder Nominations Proposal"). 
16  See Part III, infra. 
17  "Comparative law is an 'école de vérité' which enriches the 'supply of solutions' (Zitelmann) and offers 
the scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of findi ng the 'better solution' for his time and place." 
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strengthening of shareholder influence in the annual meeting as a possible consequence of the 
U.S. economy's shift toward large, institutional shareholders presents a configuration of 
interests and influences that has traditionally been found in Germany, given that banks acting 
as block shareholders and proxy agents have been important, if not dominant, players in the 
German economy.18  Indeed, at the convention held to amend the stock corporation rules 
during the Weimar Republic, the German Ministry of Justice strongly promoted the interests 
of banks, and sought to leave banks completely unregulated in their exercise of the votes from 
stock held in their customers' custody accounts, arguing that the "lethargic" shareholders 
would probably not vote unless the banks did it for them.19  It is reasonable to assume that 
this strong presence of the bank lobby also sought strengthened creditor protection in German 
corporate law, such as in the legal capital regime that pre-dated the requirements of the 
Second EC Company Law Directive20 by about 100 years,21 and the creditor-oriented 
                                                                                                                                                 
Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (Tony Wier, trans., 3rd 
ed., 1998), at 15. 
18 Banks exercise influence over German corporations in three ways.  First, German "universal" banks 
are permitted to hold equity stakes in industrial companies, and have done so, although this trend has 
been decreasing in recent decades.  Based on data from the late 1990's, Barca and Becht show that 
banks and bank-related investment firms hold 82 voting blocks with a median size just under 15 % of 
372 public industrial companies in Germany. Farizio Barca & Marco Becht, THE CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE EUROPE 143 (2001).  Second, given that most German stock takes the form of bearer 
shares, beneficial owners have traditionally held their stock in bank custody accounts, allowing the 
bank to exercise the stock's voting power. Beginning in the 1870's large German banks exercised the 
voting power of stock in their custody, even without formal proxy from the owners. See Robin Tuerks, 
DEPOTSTIMMRECHTSPRAXIS VERSUS U.S.-PROXY-SYSTEM 5 (2000).  In the 1992 annual meetings of the 
20 blue chip companies on the DAX index that issued voting bearer shares, banks held more votes than 
all other blockholders in 19 companies. Barca, Id. at 129 et seq.  Third, German companies have in the 
past relied heavily on bank credit, thus giving banks an incentive to monitor their debtors' behaviour.  
Prof. John Coffee points out how the generous lending of the German Central Bank in the la te 19th 
century served to make industrial companies dependent on bank credit, thus stunting the growth of the 
securities markets. John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State 
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 55 et seq. (2001).  It should be noted, 
however, that in recent decades only small and medium sized German companies rely heavily on 
commercial credit, and thus – at least as far as the power of banks as lenders goes – "[t]he description 
of the German corporate governance system as bank oriented is misleading." Theodor Baums, The 
German Banking System and its Impact on Corporate Finance and Governance , in THE JAPANESE 
MAIN BANK SYSTEM 409, 445 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., 1995). 
19  Peter Hommelhoff, Machtbalancen im Aktienrecht , in DIE AKTIENRECHTSREFORM AM ENDE DER 
WEIMAR REPUBLIK 71, 91 et seq. (Wolfgang Schubert & Peter Hommelhoff, eds., 1987).  The use of 
bank proxies was in fact regulated in the law that eventually entered into fo rce in 1937, Id. at 92.  
Deliberately moving in the direction of the U.S. proxy rules, German law has sought increasingly to 
provide the beneficial owners of stock with more information through their custodian banks and to 
bind such banks more tightly on the will of the beneficial owners.  For a discussion of the reform 
measures adopted in 1998, see Sabine Knauer, NEUREGELUNGEN DES DEPOTSTIMMRECHTS NACH DEM 
KONTRAG, PRAKTISCHE BEWÄHRUNG UND WEITERE REFORMBEDÜRFTIGKEIT 37 et seq. (2003). 
20  Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection 
of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
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German accounting principles.22  However, the power of banks as shareholders and proxy 
agents has tended to outweigh their influence as lenders, and banks thus probably sought 
protections on both sides of the traditional dichotomy of shareholder and creditor interests.23  
Because German banks have exercised their influence primarily as institutional investors and 
proxy agents rather than lenders,24 it is likely that they supported the other large, blockholders 
in seeking shareholder rights.25  The result has been a body of corporate law that disfavors the 
type of protections to which dispersed and individual shareholders can take recourse, such as 
derivative or direct actions against management for breach of fiduciary duties,26 but favors 
                                                                                                                                                 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public 
limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making 
such safeguards equivalent (77/91/EEC). 
21  On the creditor protection aim of the various rules in German law regulating the creation  and 
maintenance of legal capital, see ANDREAS CAHN, KAPITALERHALTUNG IM KONZERN 12 et seq. (1998).  
For a general discussion in English of the German legal capital rules, see Friedrick Kübler, The Rules 
of Capital under Pressure of the Securities Markets , in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 95 
(Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, 2003). 
22  See HERBERT WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT Vol. I, 29 (1980) ("Die offizielle Reformdiskussion 
wandte sich, wohl nicht unbeeinflusst von den leitenden Kreisen der Industrie und B anken, den Fragen 
der Kapitalbildung zu.").  An example of the creditor-oriented nature of German accounting principles 
is found in § 252(1) no. (4) of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB), according to which 
foreseeable losses are to be booked before they occur, yet profit to be booked only when it is received.  
See Wolfgang Ballwieser, Comment on § 252 HGB, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR: ZUM 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH Vol. 4 (2001) for a thorough discussion and bibliography. 
23  A classic discussion of these competing interests is found in BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, A 
CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 5 et seq. (3rd ed. 1990). 
24  "The typical large German firm with dispersed shareholders finds its shares in voting blocks which are 
voted by a few banks . . . . This voting power, which helps place representatives of the banks on the 
supervisory board, comes from different sources: from directly owned stock, from investment 
companies controlled by banks, or from voting the shares held by banks as custodians for their clients." 
Theodor Baums, Takeovers versus Institutions in Corporate Governance in Germany, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151, 158 (D. D. Prentice & P. R. J. Holland, eds., 
1993), also see Theodor Baums, Vollmachtstimmrecht der Banken – Ja oder Nein?, 1 DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 11 (1996). 
25  As Barca and Becht point out, individuals and industrial firms hold a total of 385 voting blocks (out of 
648 blocks) ranging from between 5 and 62 percent in 372 public industrial companies in Germa ny.  
Barca/Becht, supra note 18, at 143, Table 5.5. 
26  See Theodor Baums, Haftung wegen Falschinformation des Sekundärmarktes", 167 ZHR 139 (2003); 
Theodor Baums & Kenneth Scott, "Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in 
the United States and Germany," Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Institute for Banking Law, 
Working Paper No. 119 (2003), available at http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/baums/; and Peter Ulmer, 
Aktienrecht im Wandel, -- Entwicklungslinien und Diskussionsschwerpunkte , 202 AcP 143, 163 et seq. 
(2002). 
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shareholder empowerment in the annual meeting,27 including significant powers to shape the 
agenda and the slate of nominees that will be considered at the meeting. 
This is by no means to say that German law is influencing U.S. law, in a way that a dual 
listing might convey a direct influence from one system to another,28 but rather to note that 
similar configurations of interested parties tend to seek similar legal rules to address similar 
tasks.  This development exhibits a form of convergence, although speculation on the 
teleological development of a system is likely to be less helpful than accurate descriptions of 
the systems under discussion and, perhaps, a "functional" analysis and comparison of relevant 
system elements.29  A review of developments affecting the remedies offered in U.S. and 
German law during recent decades appears to show the United States weakening the striking 
capabilities of individual shareholders through litigation30 or takeovers,31 and strengthening 
                                               
27  For example, while the directors of a Delaware corporation have sole authority to issue or withhold 
dividends pursuant to § 170 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the shareholders of a German 
Stock Corporation (Aktiengesellschaft , or "AG" make their own decision whether they will receive 
dividends out of the distributable profits under § 174(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz or "AktG").  This right is checked only by the fact that distributable profits are derived 
on the basis on the balance sheet after the management makes appropriations to reserves pursuant to 
§ 58 AktG.  See Günther Henn, DIE RECHTE DES AKTIONÄRS: RECHTE UND PFLICHTEN IN UND 
AUßERHALB DER HAUPTVERSAMMLUNG 48-49 (1984).  Shareholders also appoint the AG's auditors 
(§318 HGB) and may appoint a special auditor to investigate the board's handling of contributions to 
capital or management (§ 142 AktG).  The capital of an AG may only be increased or decreased with 
shareholder approval (§§182, 192, 202 207, 222, 229, 237 AktG), including by way of an issue of 
convertible debt securities (§ 221 AktG). Given that the shareholders of an AG have statutory pre-
emptive rights, they must vote to waive such rights before any new shares may be issued to third parties 
free of rights (§ 186 AktG).  The shareholders of an AG also have somewhat more authority over 
structural changes than is provided under Delaware law.  As in Delaware, German  shareholders have a 
veto over business combinations (§§ 319, 320 AktG; §§ 65, 73 Reorganization Act – 
Umwandlungsgesetz or "UmwG") and sales of all or substantially all of the corporate assets (§ 179a 
AktG).  However, shareholders also have a voice in spin-offs or divisions (§§ 65, 125 UmwG) and in 
corporate alliance contracts that create relationships of control or diversions of profits (§  293, 295 
AktG). 
28  "[B]ecause cross-listing on a U.S. exchange commits an issuer to at least some marginal change in its 
governance and disclosure practices, a deeper regulatory competition over governance and disclosure 
philosophies thus underlies the surface of cross-border competition among market centers for listings 
and trading volume. Competition need not, however,  drive corporate governance in a single direction." 
John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance , 102 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1757, 1761 (2002) and – 
The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its 
Implications, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY L. R. 641, 663 (1999). 
29  See REINER R. KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 3 et. seq. (2004). 
30  In 1994, U.S. the Supreme Court, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , 511 
U.S. 164, 128 L.Ed 2d 119 (1994), read the language of § 10 Exchange Act as restricting actions for 
securities fraud to primary actors who themselves commit fraud, thereby eliminating actions for aiding 
and abetting. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104 -67) was 
promulgated to reduce the number of abusive law suits filed against heavily capitalized persons to seek 
compensation for losses from bad investments and raised the hurdles for plaintiffs in a securities fraud 
action.  Neither of these initiatives was reversed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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the ability of larger shareholders or groups of shareholders to act within corporate "political" 
mechanisms,32 while Germany is moving in a complementary direction by working to 
strengthen shareholder suits33 and decrease the control that some block holders exercise over 
the shares that they hold in custody for others.34 
This paper will study the ability of shareholders to nominate candidates for election to 
their corporation's board in the United States and in Germany.  Part II will briefly discuss the 
position of the shareholder under U.S. state and federal law.  Part III will then take a look at 
the arguments that have been raised for and against more shareholder participation in U.S. 
corporations in the context of the SEC's Security Holder Nominations Proposal.  Part IV will 
outline the powers that shareholders have within German corporations to call meetings, shape 
the agenda, nominate candidates and vote for them.  Part V offers concluding remarks. 
II. THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS IN U.S. COMPANIES 
A. Position of Shareholders under Delaware Law and U.S. Federal Law 
Corporate Law in the United States is of course state law, and most listed companies 
are incorporated under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.35  However, 
U.S. companies must also comply with a significant regime of federal securities law.  Any 
public offerings of securities must be registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 
(hereinafter, the "Securities Act"), fraudulent practices in connection with securities can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
31  Prof. Coffee summarizes the decline in takeover activity succinctly: "The rate of takeovers and other 
acquisitions has declined significantly and continues to decline.  During the first quarter of 1991, 
merger and acquisition activity declined 18% over the corresponding quarter in the preceding year and 
hit an eleven year low.  See Mergers at an 11-year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at D10.  The 
reasons for this decline are various: The drying up of the junk bond market; restrictive state 
antitakeover legislation, see infra note 5 and accompanying text; and judicial decisions that have 
accepted preemptive defensive tactics by target management.  See, e.g., Paramount Communications 
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). This decline in takeover activity, particularly as a result 
of restrictive state legislation, has supplied the impetus, in my judgment, for s cholars to consider the 
thesis that politics, more than economics, shaped the modern American corporation." Coffee, supra 
note 3, at 1277, n. 1. 
32  For a discussion of shareholder voting and the use of proxy contests as a "political" model opposed to 
the "transaction" model of the market for corporate control, see John Pound, The Rise of the Political 
Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1993). 
33  See Baums & Scott, supra note 26. 
34  See Knauer, supra note 19, at 81,and Tuerks, supra note 18, at 35 et seq. 
35  According to the Department of State, Division of Corporations, of the State of Delaware, as consulted 
in November 2004, "more than half a million business entities have their legal home in Delaware 
including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500." This 
information is available at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml/.  
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prosecuted under the Exchange Act, and if an issuer is required to register with the SEC,36 it 
must comply with the reporting requirements of § 13 Exchange Act and the proxy rules 
issued under § 14 of the Exchange Act.37  As a result, corporations are governed in the 
United States by both state and federal law.38  Generally speaking, state corporate law 
governs what might be called the "substantive" rights of a shareholder in connection with the 
assets and governance of the corporation, while federal law may only encroach on this 
territory where specifically provided by Congress,39 and has done so to require corporations 
to make certain disclosures and follow specified procedures designed to protect investors and 
the market as a whole.40  The line drawn by this substantive/disclosure distinction has been 
somewhat blurred by the independent audit committee requirements and the prohibition of 
loans to directors introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,41 which go to the 
substantive composition of a company's board of directors and its activities.  When disclosure 
is required under federal rules, it is almost always designed to facilitate an informed exercise 
of the substantive rights provided under state law. 
Thus, state corporate law generally governs the "substantive" matters on which 
shareholders may vote.  The corporate laws of the U.S. states tend to leave significant 
                                               
36  Securities must be registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act if either (i) if they are listed on a national 
securities exchange (§ 12(a) Exchange Act), (ii) if the issuer of the securities has more than 500 
shareholders and total assets exceeding $ 10 million (§ 12(g) Exchange Act in connection with 
Exchange Act Rule 12g-1), or (iii) the issuer has made an offering of securities under the Securities 
Act of 1933, but only during the fiscal year in which the issuer makes such offering (§ 15(d) Exchange 
Act). 
37  For an excellent presentation of the reporting requirements under § 13 Exchange Act and the proxy 
requirements under § 14 Exchange Act, see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, 509-518 and 534-593 (5th ed. 2004). 
38  This is of course without referring to the various laws that might regulate a particular type of business 
activity, with regard to its environmental impact, antitrust considerations or other effects on the 
society. 
39  Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("corporations are creatures of state law, and 
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will 
govern the internal affairs of the corporation.").  
40  See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: the SEC's Strategic Pursuit of 
Managerial Accountability , 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 449 (2001). 
41  Pub. L. No. 107-204, July 30, 2002,116 Stat. 745. Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requires the boards of directors of all listed companies to have an audit committee consisting entirely of 
independent directors, thereby mandating a specific type of governance organ to be established in each 
such listed corporation. This section was incorporated into the Exchange Act as § 10A(m).  To 
implement § 301, the SEC issued the rules codified as 17 CFR § 240.10A–3. See Final Rule: Standards 
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, SEC Release Nos. 33–8220; 34–47654, 68 Federal 
Register 18788 (April 16, 2003).  Section 402 of the Act prohibited loans to executives in most cases.  
This section was incorporated into the Exchange Act as § 13(k). 
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freedom for the contracting parties ex ante, while providing injured persons with relatively 
effective remedies in court ex post.42  For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law 
("Del. Gen. Corp. Law") provides the relevant parties with almost unlimited freedom to 
structure a corporation as they see fit, and – unless the parties have used this freedom to 
introduce special limitations in the certificate of incorporation – gives management 
substantially unlimited power over the corporation.  Pursuant to § 141(a) Del. Gen. Corp. 
Law, a corporation is managed "by or under the direction of the board of directors," which 
means that the board has exclusive authority to initiate almost all corporate actions.  For 
example, although the shareholders have a right to vote on major structural changes, such as 
mergers or consolidations (§ 251(c) Del. Gen. Corp. Law) or sales, leases or exchanges of all 
or substantially all of the corporation's property and assets (§ 271(a) Del. Gen. Corp. Law), 
the board has sole authority to put any such decision to shareholder vote and, in the case of a 
sale, lease or exchange of assets, the board need not consummate the transaction even after 
the shareholders have voted to approve it (§ 271(b) Del. Gen. Corp. Law).43  The board of 
directors also has exclusive authority to decide whether the company will pay dividends 
(§ 170 Del. Gen. Corp. Law).  Much of the board's authority may be redistributed in the 
certificate of incorporation, and such amendment takes place by shareholder vote (§ 242(b) 
Del. Gen. Corp. Law), but the board has sole authority to initiate the procedure amending the 
certificate (§ 242(b)(1) Del. Gen. Corp. Law).  This leaves the shareholders with two avenues 
– aside from consents44 – through which they may exercise direct influence on their own 
                                               
42  See David C. Donald, Some Observations on the Use of Structural and Remedial Measures in 
American and German Law After Sarbanes-Oxley, 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL No. 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=231 . This dichotomy is elaborated much more 
extensively, but without the specific focus on U.S. and German remedies, in Kraakman et al., supra 
note 29, at 27 et. seq. 
43  See the valuable perspective illustrated by Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, in "The Case for Empowering 
Shareholders" (2003), available from the Social Sciences Research Network at http://ssrn.com/.  
 
44  Under § 228 Del. Gen. Corp. Law, "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, any 
action required . . . to be taken at any annual or special meeting of stockholders . . . may be taken 
without a meeting, without prior notice and with out a vote, if a consent or consents in writing, setting 
forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the 
minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting. . . ."  
Combined with the fact that § 220 Del. Gen. Corp. Law allows a stockholder to obtain a list of a 
corporation's stockholders for the purpose of communicating with them (see The Conservative Caucus 
Research Analysis & Education Foundation, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569 (Del. Ch. 1987), 
and the increasing efficiency of communications technology, the use of consents would seem to offer a 
powerful tool for shareholders.  However, the way information is channelled in the current indirect 
system for holding securities destroys the value of stockholder lists by reducing them to one or two 
nominees or street names. See Loss & Seligman, supra note 37, at 593 et seq. and Task Force on 
Shareholder Proposals of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securit ies, Section of the Business 
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initiative: they may, without board approval, authorize the dissolution of the corporation 
(§ 275(c) Del. Gen. Corp. Law) and they may attempt to influence the board through the 
company by-laws (§ 109 Del. Gen. Corp. Law).  A dissolution is clearly an extreme measure 
that would be appropriate only in exception cases.  The power of shareholders to exercise 
control over their company through a by-laws provision is also limited, given that it would 
have to be a forward looking, general provision that set up procedural requirements not in 
conflict with the law or the certificate of incorporation.45  These are truly blunt instruments 
with which shareholders can attempt to influence management. 
Since a corporation organized under Delaware law rests squarely in the control of its 
board of directors, the shareholders' main avenue of influence would be to choose who sits on 
that board.  Indeed, the law tells us that directors appointed for full terms receive their seats 
on the board by shareholder vote (§ 211(b) Del. Gen. Corp. Law) at the annual meeting, 
which should mean that shareholders have significant influence on the composition of the 
board.  This, however, is not the case.  The manner in which candidates are nominated and 
the type of vote with which they are elected effectively eliminates shareholder influence. 
Unless the company's certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, directors are 
elected by a "plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy and 
entitled to vote on the election of directors" (§ 216 Del. Gen. Corp. Law).46  A plurality of 
the votes means the largest portion of votes cast.47  Thus, election by a "plurality" has no 
meaning in the absence of alternative candidates who could receive a larger portion of the 
votes cast.  If no alternative candidate is nominated, any vote would constitute a plurality.  As 
Prof. Joseph Grundfest has graphically noted, under a plurality rule, if "a million shares count 
as a quorum, and if 999,999 ballots strike your name out and say no, you, as the director, 
owning only one share, and you vote for yourself, congratulations, you win. You have the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law of the American Bar Association, "Report on Proposed Changes in Proxy Rules and Regulations 
Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate Directors," 59 BUS. LAW 109, 117-17 (2003). This 
makes the avenue of direct contact with other shareholders via consents impracticable under current 
conditions. 
45  See John C. Coffee, The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control 
Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 614 (1997). 
46  The same rule is set forth in § 7.28(a) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and § 614(a) of 
the New York Business Corporation Law. 
47  "Plurality. A large number or quantity that does not constitute a majority; a number greater than 
another, regardless of the margin . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (7th ed, 1999). 
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plurality."48  The weakness of plurality voting underscores the need of providing for a fair 
system of shareholder nominations.  As the system currently stands, shareholders have no 
opportunity to contest the election of a management candidate unless they become a 
"dissident", and pay for the distribution of proxy materials for an alternative list of 
candidates.49 
The fault in the nomination system does not lie in state law.  Pursuant to Delaware law, 
the directors must call the annual meeting within a certain time frame (§ 211, Del. Gen. Corp. 
Law), and provide adequate notice of the meeting to the shareholders (§ 222(a), Del. Gen. 
Corp. Law).50  Under Delaware law, shareholders may nominate candidates for election to the 
board either on the floor of the meeting itself,51 or through a nomination notice that is given 
to the board and distributed by the board to the other shareholders.52  However, once a 
Delaware corporation becomes subject to the registration requirements of § 12 Exchange 
Act, management must notify the shareholders of the annual meeting pursuant to the rules 
issued under § 14 Exchange Act.  Pursuant to Rule 14a-3(a), a proxy statement must be 
provided to any person from whom votes are solicited, the proxy statement must provide – 
together with an extensive list of other information – the names of the directors up for re-
election, and also provide information regarding any nominating committee the company has 
                                               
48  Remarks of Prof. Joseph Grundfest in "Symposium on Corporate Elections", 95 (Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, 
ed., November 2003), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=471640.  
49  The argument is sometimes raised that the "withholding" of votes is by itself a "very potent weapon" 
against management. Remarks of Martin Lipton in Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 48, 
at 22. However, the strength of such message depends not on any binding nature of withholding the 
vote, but only on how management might interpret its effect on their reputations, which in turn 
depends on the current understanding of shareholder rights.  The case of Walt Disney Co. presents a 
good example.  At its 2004 shareholders' meeting, votes withheld from the much criticized Michael 
Eisner exceeded 42 % of votes cast, yet the only reaction was to replace him as chairman with one of 
his closest allies, and to announce that he would step down from his CEO position two years later, at 
the normal expiration of his contract in 2006. See Institutional Shareholder Services, 2004 Postseason 
Report 5, available at http://www.issproxy.com/governance/issreports/index.jsp.  It appears that any 
reaction at all to a withhold campaign must be interpreted as a victory, but it certainly is not a "very 
potent weapon." 
50  Notice to an annual meeting need not specify the meeting's purpose if proxies are not solicited ( Stroud 
v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del Supr., 1992)), but such specification is necessary where the meeting is 
called for a specific transaction. (§ 222(a), Del. Gen. Corp. Law).  Notice must be given at least 10 
days before the meeting (§ 222(b), Del. Gen. Corp. Law), but the date of the meeting cannot be used to 
disenfranchise shareholders. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. Supr., 1971). 
51  R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS § 7.57 (1996 Supp.). 
52  This procedure is discussed in Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 96 (Del Supr., 1992). See also Millenco 
L.P. v. meVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. 824 A.2d 11, 19 (Del.Ch., 2002) ("the 'right of 
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and whether it considers nominations proposed by shareholders.53  No provision is made for 
such shareholder nominations to be included, even if the shareholders have a right to make 
such nominations under state law.  The form of proxy, or proxy card, for which specifications 
are made in Rule 14a-4, requires that provision must be made for approving or "withholding" 
a vote from the individual candidates or slate of candidates proposed.54  Rule 14a-4 does not 
specify who nominates the candidates listed on the proxy card. 
How, then, can shareholders exercise their rights to nominate candidates pursuant to 
Delaware law when the corporation is subject to the federal proxy regime?  Current Rule 14a-
8 would seem to be a logical avenue, as it allows shareholders who meet specified holding 
requirements to include a proposal and brief supporting statement in the company's proxy 
materials.55  However, a shareholder proposal may be excluded on a number of grounds, 
including if "the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of 
the jurisdiction of the company’s organization."56  This provision has been included to retain 
the balance between state corporate law and federal securities law discussed above, and 
would not present an obstacle to a Delaware shareholder seeking inclusion of a candidate for 
the board.  However, Rule 14a-8 goes farther, and also allows exclusion of all proposals 
relating to "election for membership on the company’s board of directors or analogous 
governing body."57  In this way, the state law right to nominate a candidate for the board is 
frustrated by a federal law requirement that excludes such a nomination from the primary 
document through which it could be realistically made.  The failure of the SEC's proxy 
                                                                                                                                                 
shareholders to participate in the voting process includes the right to nominate an opposing slate'") and 
Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 11779, at 12-13. 
53  Item 7 of Schedule 14A, 17 CFR § 240.14a–101. The disclosure requirements regarding nominating 
committees were recently added in an attempt to shore up a corporate governance mechanism for 
which the SEC had high hopes in the 1970s, hopes that were not fulfilled.  See Final Rule: Disclosure 
Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Secur ity Holders and 
Boards of Directors, SEC Release Nos. 33–8340; 34–48825, 68 Federal Register 69204 (December 11, 
2003) ("Nominating Committee Disclosure Release").  
54  17 CFR § 240.14a–4(b)(2). 
55  In order to qualify to submit a proposal, a shareholder must  "have continuously held at least $2,000 in 
market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for 
at least one year by the date" it submits the proposal, and continue to hold such securities through the 
date of the meeting. 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b)(1). 
56  17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1). 
57  17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
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disclosure guarantees to successfully connect with substantive powers of shareholders under 
state law weakens the potential governance uses of Rule 14a-8.58 
This leaves shareholders who desire to nominate a candidate for election to the board 
with few options prior to the meeting: they can either seek "informal" contact with the board 
and rely on its voluntary cooperation or launch a proxy contest in which they pay both for the 
printing and distribution of their own proxy materials and bear a portion of the impact of their 
opponents' spending on efforts against them (which will be funded by the corporation whose 
shares they hold).59  Such contests are rarely conducted to replace management outside of the 
takeover context.60  The only remaining alternative would be to nominate one or more 
candidates on the floor of the meeting, but this would have little actual effect because the vast 
majority of shareholders will have cast their votes by proxy on the basis of the materials 
distributed before the meeting.  The result, as the Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, Leo Strine, has noted in a law review article, is that the "proxy mechanism is titled 
heavily in favour of the management slate, and contested elections rarely occur outside the 
                                               
58  One technique that is attempted to sidestep this prohibition is a proposal to amend the company's by-
laws. This power is expressly given to shareholders in both § 109(a) Del. Gen. Corp. Law and 
§ 10.20(a) Revised Model Business Corporation Act.  The Delaware provision is used in two additional 
states and the Model Act provision is used in 23 additional states. JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON 
CORPORATIONS, 2002, § 3.06[B].  The SEC reports that it did not allow management to exclude a Rule 
14a-8 proposal to amend the by-laws of General Motors Corp. to require "a transition to independent 
directors for each seat on the audit, compensation and nominating committees a s openings occur." SEC 
Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, "Shareholder Proposals" 7 (July 13, 
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal.shtml.  In this way, shareholders were able to take 
measures against insider entrenchment in the key committees of GM's board of directors.  However, 
shareholder use of by-law amendments to exercise voice in corporate governance are limited both by a 
somewhat uncertain exclusionary practice of the SEC (see Linda C. Quinn and Ottilie L. Jarmel, The 
Shareholder Proposal Process, in Goodman & Olson, supra note 6, at 15-15 et. seq.) and by the legal 
nature of the by-laws themselves, which may not be inconsistent with law or the certificate of 
incorporation. See § 109(b) Del. Gen. Corp. Law and § 2.06(b) Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act.  Delaware courts regard by-laws generally "as the proper place for self-imposed rules and 
regulations deemed expedient for [the corporation's] convenient functioning" as opposed to the 
certificate of incorporation, which "is an instrument in which the broad and general aspects of the 
corporate entity's existence and nature are defined." Edward P. Welch & Andrew J. Turezyn, FOLK ON 
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 2002, at § 190.1, citing Gow v. Consolidated 
Coppermines Corp. 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933). On the use of by-laws for corporate governance 
purposes under Delaware law, see Coffee, supra note 45, at 613-615. 
59  See Loss & Seligman, supra note 37, at 529 et seq. and Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. NY, 
1950). 
60  Prof. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk has explained that he studied proxy contests conducted by all listed 
companies between 1996 and 2002, and found that for the thousands of companies studied over a 
period of seven years, only 80 companies experienced proxy contests to replace management outside of 
the takeover context.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot , 59 
BUS. LAW. 43, 45-46 (2003). 
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takeover context,"61 which of course raises questions about "a corporate election process that 
is so heavily biased towards incumbents and their self-chosen successors."62  This frustration 
of the shareholder franchise is particularly disturbing when one considers that such franchise 
"is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."63 
The SEC Shareholder Nominations rule was proposed against this background, and 
attempts to somewhat level the playing field by requiring disclosure of the shareholder 
nominations – under very limited circumstances – in the materials distributed pursuant to § 14 
Exchange Act.64  The comments the SEC received on this proposal were divided between 
investors (such as investment funds, pension funds, and private persons) in favor and 
management against.65 
B. The SEC Security Holder Nominations Proposal 
For decades the SEC has periodically considered issuing rules to give shareholders an 
official channel of communication to propose candidates for election to the boards of publicly 
held companies.66  The proposing release to the Security Holder Nominations Proposal notes 
that shareholder nomination of candidates was seriously considered in 1942 and in 1977, but 
no formal proposal was made.67  The SEC decided against a proposal in 1977 because the use 
of nominating committees – which were hoped to be a possible cure for the self-perpetuation 
of insiders on corporate boards – was just emerging, so the SEC staff advised to monitor 
developments and not adopt an additional rule at that time.68  However, as the October 14, 
2003 proposing release explained: "the presence of nominating committees has not eliminated 
the concerns among some securityholders with regard to the barriers to meaningful 
participation in the proxy process in connection with the nomination and election of 
directors."69 
                                               
61  Strine, supra note 8, at 1377. 
62  Id., at 1397. 
63  Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corporation, 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch., 1988). 
64  The proposal seeks to provide shareholders with "meaningful participation in the proxy process in 
connection with the nomination and election of directors." Security Holder Nominations Proposal, 
supra note 15, at 60786. 
65  Most comments are available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml.  
66  Security Holder Nominations Proposal, supra note 15, at 60785. 
67  Id. 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 60786. 
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The core of the proposal is simple.  If the state law governing the affairs of the relevant 
corporation allows shareholders to propose a candidate for the board, a new Rule 14a-11 
would allow such candidates to be included in the company's proxy materials that are 
distributed pursuant to federal rules.70  Proposed Rule 14a-11 would thus facilitate disclosure 
of a matter to be raised at the shareholder's meeting.  As such, Rule 14a-11 would fall within 
the SEC's scope of authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act, as interpreted by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in its 1990 decision, The Business Roundtable v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which explains the "purpose of the proxy protections 
as ensuring that stockholders have 'adequate knowledge' about the 'the major questions of 
policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings.'"71  Unless a major corporate action, like 
a merger, is to be addressed at a shareholders' meeting, the replacement of seated directors is 
likely to be connected to "major questions of policy" in the future operation of the 
corporation.72  Because federal rules have for years frustrated the exercise of this state law 
right, the change would likely have "sweeping consequences to governance of publicly held 
companies in the United States,"73 as shareholders would again have a meaningful opportunity 
to use an almost forgotten right.  Such potential "sweeping consequences" would upset the 
understanding of shareholders as apathetic, uninvolved and impotent, which Bearle and 
Means presented in 1932.74  Corporate management therefore marshaled strong resistance to 
the proposal,75 which led the SEC to qualify application of the proposed rule by introducing a 
                                               
70  See Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60788 and proposed Exchange Act Rule 
14a-11, printed in Id. 60819 et seq. 
71  The Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 905 F.2d 406, 410 (DC Cir. 1990), 
citing the Senate Report prepared at the time the Exchange Act was adopted, Senate Report No. 792, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). 
72  See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D. NY, 1950) finding that the replacement of 
management is inseparable from policy questions. Also see Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen 
Corp. 171 A. 226, 229 (Del.Ch. 1934) ("It is impossible in many cases of intracorporate contests over 
directors, to sever questions of policy from those of persons.") 
73  Comments of Debevoise & Plimpton, December 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml/. 
74  See supra note 1, an accompanying text. 
75  See, for example, the comments of Michael C. Wyatt, Chair, Corporate & Securities Law Committee, 
Association of Corporate Counsel, January 12, 2004 (having shareholder nominees on the board would 
create a "confrontational" atmosphere), comments of Henry A. McKinnell, Ph.D., Chairman of the 
Board and CEO, Pfizer Inc.; Chairman, The Business Roundtable, December 22, 2003 (the rule would 
place special interests in the board), and comments of 8 officers of Caterpillar Inc. beginning 
December 12, 2003 and after (the rule could undercut the role of the board and its nominating 
committee), available at http://www.sec.gov/ru les/proposed/s71903.shtml/. 
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complex series of triggering events and eligibility requirements that must be met before a 
shareholder can include its intended nominee in the proxy materials. 
Pursuant to the October 2003 proposal, there would be two triggering events, which 
are designed to ensure that the rule would be used only when it is needed.76  One is an opt-in, 
requiring shareholders to choose application of the rule by a qualifying shareholder77 
submitting a proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8, and such proposal receiving more than 50% of 
the votes cast on it at the shareholders' meeting.78  This straightforward choice presents no 
potential conflict with state law.  The other, which is a "blind" trigger, however, does.  
Pursuant to this trigger, Rule 14a-11 would become applicable if: 
At least one of the registrant’s nominees for the board of directors for whom the 
registrant solicited proxies received ‘‘withhold’’ votes from more than 35% of the 
votes cast at an annual meeting of security holders (or, in lieu of an annual 
meeting, a special meeting) held after January 1, 2004, at which directors were 
elected (provided, that this event will be deemed not to occur with regard to any 
contested election to which § 240.14a–12(c) applies or an election to which this 
section applies).79 
This triggering event would ascribe a secondary meaning to votes that shareholders 
intend to cast in favor of or withhold from the election of a particular director, ascribing a 
symbolic value to a totally different action, and treating shareholders as a group that cannot 
think and act for itself.  This blind trigger would also interfere with the exercise of a state law 
right.  As Prof. John Coffee has remarked, this secondary meaning would "skew" (distort) the 
vote on the principal issue of the resolution.80  A shareholder might decide to cast or withhold 
a vote for the sole purpose of triggering or preventing the trigger of Rule 14a-11, which 
would make election results confusing.  In this way, a secondary, federal meaning would be 
tacked on to a vote exercised under state law for an essentially unrelated issue.  The process 
encumbers shareholder votes with a secondary value that is unexpressed (i.e., the vote would 
still be expressly cast or withheld for the election of a director, not for application of the rule), 
contingent (i.e., the unexpressed meaning of the vote would not arise unless the withholds 
                                               
76  § 240.14-11(a), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60819. 
77  Such a shareholder would have to hold "more than 1% of the securities entitled to vote on that proposal 
for at least one year as of the date the proposal was submitted and provide evidence of such holding" to 
the company. § 240.14-11(a)(2)(ii), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 
60819. 
78  § 240.14-11(a)(2)(ii), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60819. 
79  § 240.14-11(a)(2)(i), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60819. 
80  See Remarks of Prof. John Coffee in Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 56, at 98 et seq. 
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exceed 35% of the votes cast), and ancillary (i.e., reaching the 35% threshold would have no 
impact on whether the director in question is in fact elected).  Such a redefinition of the value 
of the voting rights attaching to a corporation's shares not only causes "votes [to be] affected 
by ulterior considerations,"81 but also may exceed the SEC's present statutory authority under 
§ 14 of the Exchange Act.  As such, the express opt-in trigger is superior unless we are to 
understand shareholders condescendingly as a constituency that is unable to grasp the 
meaning of Rule 14a-11 and take deliberate action themselves to ensure its application.82 
The eligibility requirements set forth in section (b) of the proposed Rule are designed to 
prevent the ballot access rule from becoming a tool of corporate raiders and "gadfly" 
shareholders,83 and the requirements restricting relationships between nominees and 
shareholders is designed to prevent the development of "special interest" directors.84  To 
discourage "gadflies", a nominating shareholder or shareholder group must have held "more 
than 5% of the registrant's securities that are eligible to vote for the election of directors"85 
"continuously for at least two years and intend to continue to hold those securities through 
the date of the subject election of directors."86  As the SEC explains, these requirements 
attempt to "balance security holders' interest in being able to access company proxy materials 
for the purpose of nominating directors against companies’ concerns about the potential 
disruption that some contend may result from frequent use of the process by security holders 
who do not represent a significant ownership stake in the subject company."87  An American 
                                               
81  See Id. at 99. 
82  By supplementing an express opt-in with a trigger that hinges on the circumstances Rule 14a-11 is 
designed to prevent, i.e., powerless shareholders who futilely withhold votes during an election, it 
appears that the SEC is also adopting the patronising stance resembling what has been referred to as 
management's erroneous attribution to investors of "a child-like simplicity." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988).  The very assumption that the proposed rule is designed to dispel is that 
shareholders are unable to understand issues, make decisions and take action.  It would therefore seem 
advisable – especially given the potential skewing of elections and conflicts with state law – that the 
SEC trust shareholders to propose and vote on an opt-in proposal rather than advocating a blind 
trigger. 
83  "Gadfly" is a term used to refer to "activist shareholders" who make proposals that are not invited by 
management. For a discussion of such activities, see Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 162 (3rd ed, 2004).  The argument recognized by the SEC is that "the composition of the 
board of directors is critical to a corporation's functions and, accordingly, security holders should have 
to evidence a significant financial interest." Security Holder Nominati ons Proposal supra note 15, at 
60794. 
84  See Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60795. 
85  § 240.14-11(b)(1), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60820. 
86  § 240.14-11(b)(2), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60820. 
87  Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60794. 
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Bar Association task force has expressed concern that eligibility requirements giving 
nomination rights to large shareholders could conflict with the general rule under Delaware 
law, deriving from § 212(a) Del. Gen. Corp. Law, that holder of the same class of shares be 
treated equally.88  In this regard, it may be useful to remember that the ABA's Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act also includes a general, equal treatment provision (§ 6.01(a) 
RMBCA), but allows shareholders or groups of shareholders holding 10% of the votes 
entitled to be cast at a given type of meeting to demand the convening of such meeting 
(§ 7.02(a)(2) RMBCA). 
Because proposed Rule 14a-11 intends to give large, longer-term shareholders more 
potential to influence the board, it also tends to run up against the SEC's "creeping tender 
offer" rules,89 which are designed precisely to prevent such shareholders from increasing their 
power over the company without declaring a tender offer, thereby avoiding the procedural 
safeguards and required disclosure that such an offer entails. 
Therefore, the proposed rule also requires that the nominating shareholder or group be 
"passive" in the sense that they have no intention to change or influence the control of the 
issuer.90  This is done by requiring the nominating shareholder to fall within an existing 
category that distinguishes financial institutions holding shares as portfolio investments from 
investors seeking control.91  This, of course, creates the peculiar situation in which a 
shareholder hopes to have his or her candidate placed on the board, but avows no intention to 
influence the management of the corporation.  To avoid too close a contact between 
nominating shareholders and board members they nominate, which could also result in 
"special interest" directors who could disrupt the board by promoting the interests of their 
nominating shareholder above the good of the company, proposed Rule 14a-11 also requires 
nominees to be independent of the nominating shareholder.92  The nominating shareholder or 
                                               
88  See ABA Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 133 et seq. Also see the comments of 
The Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York State Bar 
Association dated December 22, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/.  
89  See 17 CFR § 240.13d–1 et seq., discussed in, inter alia, Loss & Seligman, supra note 37, at 619 et 
seq. 
90  See § 240.14-11(b)(3), (4), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60820. 
91  The distinction is set forth in 17 CFR § 240.13.d-1, which differentiates between persons that may use 
Schedule 13D, which is designed for active investors (17 CFR § 240.13d–101) and those eligible for 
Schedule 13G, which is designed for passive or institutional investors (17 CFR § 240.13d–102). 
92  See § 240.14-11(c)(2)-(4), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60820-
21. The independence requirement resembles existing, similar requirements for all independent board 
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nominating group must disclose compliance with eligibility and independence requirements 
during the nomination process,93 and must hold the company harmless from any false or 
misleading information published in such disclosure.94 
The proposed rule would restrict the number of permitted shareholder nominees, which 
would be set in relation to the size of the company's board.95  Only one nominee would be 
permitted in a board of up to eight members, two nominees in a board of between nine and 19 
members, and three nominees in a board of 20 or more members.96  To avoid the potential 
costs and disruptive effect of a number of shareholders simultaneously nominating candidates, 
the rule allows only one nominating shareholder, which would be that shareholder or group 
with "the largest two-year beneficial ownership at the time" the notice of nomination is 
delivered.97  This, again, would raise the same question of distinctions among, and thus 
unequal treatment of shareholders, but would likely be permissible for the reasons discussed 
above.  To ease the cost and difficulty of assembling support to propose a nominee, the rule 
would exempt the shareholders' solicitation of support for the nomination from most of the 
extensive proxy solicitation rules, provided that (i) no more than 30 persons are solicited or 
the solicitation states no more than the intent to form a nominating group, the holding 
percentage of each member, and how the soliciting party can be contracted, and (ii) a copy of 
the solicitation materials are filed with the SEC on or before the date they are sent out.98  
Such communication between shareholders could perhaps be facilitated through an electronic 
message board, as discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra, and will in any case be significantly 
impeded by the indirect holding system, in which exact information on the identity of the 
shareholders is known only to the clearing agency and its participants, but is almost never 
                                                                                                                                                 
members, but is focused on guarding against ties specifically between the nominee and the nominating 
shareholder or group of shareholders.  It prohibits the nominee from being first, the nominating 
shareholder or a member of the nominating group (§ 240.14-11(c)(3)(i)), second, an employee of the 
nominating shareholder or any group member (§ 240.14-11(c)(3)(ii)), third, a recipient of fees from the 
nominating shareholder or group member (§ 240.14-11(c)(3)(iii)), fourth, an executive officer or 
director of the nominating shareholder or any group member (§  240.14-11(c)(3)(iv)(A)), fifth, neither 
controlling nor controlled by the nominating shareholder or any group member (§  240.14-
11(c)(3)(iv)(B)), and sixth, in compliance with the applicable independence requirements for directors 
under the relevant stock exchange rules (§ 240.14-11(c)(4)). 
93  See § 240.14-11(c), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60820 et seq. 
94  See § 240.14-11(e), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60822. 
95  See § 240.14-11(d)(1), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60822. 
96  Id. 
97  See § 240.14-11(d)(3), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60822. 
98  See § 240.14-11(f), printed in Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60822-23. 
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revealed to either the company or the shareholders themselves.99  It should also be noted in 
the context of this comparative study that the proposed Rule would not apply to "foreign 
private issuers" listed on a U.S. securities exchange.100 
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SHAREHOLDER NOMINATIONS 
A. Addressing Agency Problems through Procedurally Ensured Accountability to 
Shareholders 
Perhaps the most prominent current advocate of shareholder rights and of the SEC's 
Security Holder Nominations Proposal is Prof. Lucian Arye Bebchuk.  In his recent article, 
The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot,101 he argues for the adoption of a measure at 
least as strong as the SEC proposal, and in his working paper, "The Case for Empowering 
                                               
99  As the ABA Task Force on Shareholder Proposals notes, "[I]f it is to become a goal of federal securities 
regulation to ensure that in some or all circumstances beneficial owners of shares have a direct 
franchise without intermediation by their fiduciaries, the issue [of "street name" holdings] should be 
addressed in general, not only in the context of shareholder participation in the director election 
process." Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 117. 
100  As discussed above, the Rule would only apply to companies subject to registration with the SEC 
because they are listed on a national securities exchange (§ 12(a) Exchange Act), have over 500 
shareholders and total assets exceeding $ US 10 million (§ 12(g) Exchange Act), or have made a public 
offering of securities during the same fiscal year (§ 15(d) Exchange Act).  Pursuant to Exchange Act 
Rule 3a12-3(b), "foreign private issuers" are exempted from § 14(a) of the Exchange Act and thus from 
the rules issued under it. See 17 CFR § 240.3a12–3(b) ("Securities registered by a foreign private 
issuer, as defined in Rule 3b–4 shall be exempt from sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f) and 16 of the 
Act.").  Non-U.S. companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange would normally be "foreign private 
issuers" under Exchange Act Rule 3b-4, which defines a "foreign private issuer" as any "corporation or 
other organization incorporated or organized under the laws of any foreign country" unless "(1) More 
than 50 percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly held of record by 
residents of the United States; and (2) Any of the following: (i) The majority of the executive officers 
or directors are United States citizens or residents; (ii) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer 
are located in the United States; or (iii) The business of the issuer is administered prin cipally in the 
United States." 17 CFR § 240.3b-4.  They would therefore not be subject to the shareholder 
nominations rules.  The SEC is also considering narrowing the circle of application to include only the 
larger, more seasoned (domestic) listed companies falling under the category of "accelerated filers."  
An issuer becomes an "accelerated filer" after it meets the following conditions as of the end of its 
fiscal year: (i) the aggregate market value of the voting and non -voting common equity held by non-
affiliates of the issuer is $75 million or more; (ii) the issuer has been subject to the requirements of 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) for a period of at least twelve calendar 
months; (iii) the issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Act; and (iv) the issuer is not eligible to use Forms 10–KSB and 10–QSB (§ 249.310b and § 249.308b) 
for its annual and quarterly reports.  Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB may be used by "small business" 
issuers. 
101  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60.  Prof. Bebchuk has been concerned with the predicament 
of shareholders for some time.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for 
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1990). 
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Shareholders,"102 Prof. Bebchuk sets forth the policy and corporate law arguments that would 
support a stronger shareholder voice in certain kinds of corporate decisions. 
Both papers approach the relationship between shareholders and directors as one 
characterized by agency problems,103 i.e., potentially damaging differences between the 
decisions directors make and "those decisions that would maximize the welfare of the" 
shareholders.104  The difficulty shareholders have in attempting to correct such problems is 
that they have almost no power to influence the behavior of management.  Bebchuk points 
out that shareholder impotence is not caused solely by their dispersed state and the resulting 
"collective action problems"105 experienced by the isolated individuals, but by corporate laws 
that leave shareholders without effective rights.106  The board has sole power over the 
management of the company107 and the distribution of dividends,108 as well as the sole power 
to initiate any action regarding an amendment of the certificate of incorporation or a change 
in the state of incorporation,109 merger, sale of assets, consolidation or dissolution of the 
company.110 
                                               
102  Bebchuk, Empowering Shareholders, supra note 43. 
103  See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 57 ("Accountability [of directors to shareholders] 
is important because the interests of an agent and principal do not always fully over lap"), and Bebchuk, 
Empowering Shareholders, supra note 43, at 15 ("[T]he case against shareholder intervention should 
not be based on ignoring agency problems. Rather, it should be made by showing that such problems 
are best addressed by a regime without shareholder intervention.").  Addressing agency problems does 
not mean that the law of agency is applied literally to the relationship between shareholders and 
management. As Bebchuk notes in Empowering Shareholders at 16, footnote 31, "'[T]he relationship 
between shareholders and directors is not well described as being between principals and agents'" 
(quoting ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 22 (1986)), given that shareholders have no power 
to direct the activities of management.  Although directors ar e not the agents of shareholders in the 
legal sense of the word, they are "however, agents in the economic sense, because they are under both a 
moral and a legal obligation to manage the corporation in the interest of the shareholders." Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments; The Structure of 
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, at 1471, footnote 46 (1989). 
104  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, in A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 86 (Michael C. Jensen, ed., 2000).  
105  See Clark, supra note 103, at 390 et seq. 
106  Bebchuk, Empowering Shareholders, supra note 43, at 7.  It would appear that any legal inadequacies 
in the statutory power of shareholders cannot be excused with assertions that shareholders are by 
nature "lethargic" or "rationally apathetic".  Empirical difficulties should serve as a basis for designing 
legal solutions, not as an excuse for neglecting their pursuit. 
107  Id., at 9. 
108  Id., at 12. 
109  Id., at 10 et seq. 
110  Id., at 11 et seq., regarding dissolution see footnote 15. 
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This leaves shareholders with one "weapon of last resort," the power to replace 
directors.111  Yet such right "is largely a myth.  Attempts to replace directors are extremely 
rare, even in firms that systematically under perform over a long period of time.  By and large, 
directors nominated by the company run unopposed and their election is thus guaranteed.  
The key for a director's re-election is remaining on the firm's slate."112  Access to the firm's 
slate of director candidates is, moreover, controlled by the board, and the presence of 
independent directors on a board nominating committee fails to provide comfort exactly in 
those cases when it is most needed: when shareholders mistrust the board and wish to appoint 
new members.113  Because proxy contests are financed by a single shareholder or group of 
shareholders, yet benefit all shareholders, they present a "public good" problem, in that the 
active shareholder is forced to become the benefactor of all other shareholders.114  Providing 
access to the company's proxy machinery would reduce these costs for the active 
shareholder.115 
Bebchuk then addresses a number of arguments raised against shareholder nomination.  
The fear that directors nominated by shareholders would serve "special interests" is 
unfounded because, "[u]nlike cumulative voting, shareholder access would not enable any 
candidate to be elected without majority support among shareholders."116  The prediction that 
contested elections would occur often, disrupting the corporation and wasting its assets is 
unfounded given the passive character of most institutional investors – which would make the 
possibility of nomination more of a threat and deterrent than an often used tool.117  Bebchuk 
                                               
111  Id., at 16. 
112  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 45 et seq., citing a study performed on proxy contests 
held by listed companies between 1996 and 2002, which showed that on an average only two contests 
were run each year for companies with market capitalization exceeding $  200 million. 
113  Id., at 49.  The domination of the nomination process by incumbent management is well known and 
documented.  See Clark, supra note 103, at 109 ("It is a notorious fact that in the over -whelming 
majority of elections for directorships in public corporations the public shareholders simply vote for 
whomever is proposed by the corporation's nominating committee. At least in the past . . . . Nominees 
tended to be agreeable, chummy persons, usually of the same social class as the incumbents. . . . This 
characterization frequently had to be qualified, however, when t he corporation had a large shareholder 
whose director-representatives were really looking out for that shareholder's interest."); Task Force on 
Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 118; Monks/Minow, supra note 75, at 212 et seq., and Strine, 
supra note 8, at 1377. 
114  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 45; also see Pozen, supra note 4, at 99. 
115  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 47. 
116  Id., at 55. 
117  Id., at 52 et seq. 
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counters the fear that the possibility of removal would deter good directors from serving with 
the prediction that, "[p]roviding directors with complete job security as a means of attracting 
directors would be counterproductive."118 
Bebchuk offers no real counterargument against the criticism that, because the directors 
comprising the nominating committee are subject to a fiduciary duty to the company119 and 
are well informed of the board's current needs in terms of skills and backgrounds for a board 
slot,120 such committee would be able to make superior choices for nomination.  Instead, he 
counters the "stupid shareholder" aspect of the argument by pointing out that institutional 
investors possess the sophistication necessary to choose nominees.121  He addresses the 
common argument that shareholder-nominated directors on the board would produce a 
"balkanized, politicized and dysfunctional board" with the reminder that a shareholder-
nominated director would be elected by a majority of the shareholders and thus committed to 
enhancing shareholder value; as a result, "[o]ther directors should not be expected to have 
legitimate reasons either to be on guard against such shareholder-nominated directors or to 
treat them with suspicion."122  With regard to another variation of the fiduciary duty 
argument, i.e., that directors are subject to such a duty, but shareholders are not,123 making 
their nominees a potential threat to creditors or employees, Bebchuk points out that "[b]y 
making directors accountable to no one and protecting them from removal even in the event 
of dismal performance, such limits would be costly to both shareholders and stakeholders."124  
In the final part of his argument, Bebchuk points out empirical evidence showing the shares of 
companies with boards insulated from removal have lower market value.125  He also 
somewhat discounts the effectiveness of the currently favored governance tool – independent 
                                               
118  Id., at 54. 
119  Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contest in the Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 93 (2003). 
120  Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 122. 
121  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 56 et seq. 
122  Id., at 58. 
123  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 79. 
124  Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 60, at 59 (emphasis in original).  Here it might have been 
useful to point out that shareholders are under certain circumstances subject to fiduciary duties.  See 
note 122, and accompanying text. 
125  Id., at 61 et seq. 
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directors, by stating that no solid evidence demonstrates "a systematic correlation between 
having a majority of independent directors and corporate value and performance."126 
B. Protecting the Company through Management's Fiduciary Duties 
Two members of the prominent U.S. law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz – 
Messrs. Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum – offer arguments against the shareholder 
nomination of director candidates in their article, Election Contest in the Company's Proxy: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come.127  The paper approaches the relationship between 
shareholders and directors from a "managerialist viewpoint",128 i.e., shareholders should not 
interfere with the activities of management because the "directors and officers of the 
corporation are the only constituency that has legal obligations to act in the best interest of 
the corporation. . . . to balance all the competing interests of the corporation and try to ensure 
the long-term health and success of the enterprise as a whole."129  The predictability lent by a 
body of directors' fiduciary duties that have been carefully parsed in decades of litigation is a 
strong argument for this viewpoint.130  On the other hand, it is also true that controlling 
shareholders do owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and to minority shareholders,131 and 
that numerous types of state and federal law actions may be brought against any person 
employing fraud in the solicitation of proxies.132  The fiduciary duties of directors have been 
                                               
126  Id., at 63. Also see Sanjai Bhagat & Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Uncertain Relation between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999). 
127  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119. 
128  As Prof. Melvin Eisenberg points out, "the managerialists . . . would achieve ends of social policy by 
increasing management power, on the theory that while shareholders are interested only in profits, and 
client-groups only in their own welfare, management is in a position to balan ce the claims of all groups 
dependent on the corporation, including not only client-groups and shareholders, but the general 
public; in a position, that is, to run the corporation in the public interest."  M. Eisenberg, THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 25 (1976). 
129  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 79. 
130  "The most general formulation of corporate law's attempted solution to the problem of managerial 
accountability is the fiduciary duty of loyalty: the corporation's directors, officers, and, in some 
respects and situations, its controlling shareholders owe a duty of undivided loyalty to their corporation 
. . . . The overwhelming majority of particular rules, doctrines, and cases in corporate law are simply 
an explication of this duty or of the procedural rules and institutional arrangements involved in 
implementing it."  Clark, supra note 103, at 34 (italics in original).  
131  See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (1994), Sinclair Oil Corporation v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (1971), and Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (1969). Also see 
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Controlling Controlling Shareholders," Columbia Law School, 
The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper no. 228 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=417181. 
132  With regard to federal law, see 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a) ("No solicitation subject to this regulation shall 
be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, 
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crafted by the decisions of courts in cases challenging the actions of such directors; if federal 
rules have largely prevented shareholders from nominating candidates for their company's 
board, how could cases have arisen to craft the relevant fiduciary duties for shareholders?  
Moreover, aside from violations of clear requirements applicable to candidates, such as 
independence requirements set forth in the rules of a stock exchange, or the selection of a 
grossly unqualified candidate, it is difficult to image the board's choice of a candidate being 
condemned by a court under principles of fiduciary duty.133 
Aside from stressing the effectiveness of directors' fiduciary duties in safeguarding other 
constituencies, Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum also attempt to refute the theoretical 
underpinnings of what they call the "managerial discipline model of corporate governance."134  
They see this model as supported by the twin assertions that shareholders are the "owners" of 
the company and that the relationship between shareholders and directors is characterized by 
agency problems.135  Their approach to the rather complex property interests certificated in a 
share of stock regretfully lacks depth.  The argument achieves its end primarily by equating 
                                                                                                                                                 
written or oral, containing any statement which . . . is false or misleading . . . ."), and with regard to 
state law see Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 86-87 (Del. Supr., 1992) ("Delaware also imposes a duty of 
full disclosure in assessing the adequacy of proxy materials under state law. See Bershad, 535 A.2d at 
846; Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 945; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708; 
Michelson, 407 A.2d at 222; Lynch, 383 A.2d at 280 (tender offer circular); Gerlach, 139 A.2d at 591. 
Two factors explain our emphasis on the adequacy of disclosures in proxy statements. First, as 
mentioned, is the fact that large public corporations must solicit proxies when seeking a shareholder 
vote. Second, and more importantly, Delaware, like Congress, has recognized that proxy voters 
generally do not attend shareholder meetings. We require proxy voters to have all material information 
reasonably available before casting their votes. Thus, proxy materials insure that directors do not use 
their "special knowledge" to their own advantage "and to the detriment of the stockholders." 
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281; Lank v. Steiner, Del.Supr., 224 A.2d 242, 244 
(1966); see also, Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.'"). 
133  A different matter would be the board's interference with the shareholders' rights to propose and elect 
candidates, as the Delaware Court of Chancery has observed, "[t]he corporate election process, if it is 
to have any validity, must be conducted with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being 
conferred or denied to any candidate or slate of candidates. In the interests of corporate democracy, 
those in charge of the election machinery of a corporation must be held to the highest standards in 
providing for and conducting corporate elections." Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206-
07 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
134  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 79. Also see Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, A New 
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinqennial Election of Directors , 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 
(1991). 
135  "Having demonstrated that the ownership analogy and the principal -agent analogy are flawed and 
insufficient bases for granting control power to shareholders as a matter of intrinsic right, . . ."  Lipton 
& Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 76. 
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non-ownership of the company's assets, a black-letter principle of corporate law,136 with non-
ownership of the company itself:  
A share of stock does not confer ownership of the underlying assets owned by the 
corporation. . . . Shareholders have no more claim to intrinsic ownership and 
control of the corporation's assets than do other stakeholders. . . .The rights we 
choose to confer on shareholders . . . cannot be justified on the basis of their 
intrinsic right as the "owners" to control the corporation (emphasis added).137 
When Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum do on occasion refer to ownership of the 
company itself, they give us the somewhat simplified example that is often found in legal 
literature because the status of shareholders as owners is not disputed:138 "the ownership of a 
share of stock in a public company is simply not analogous to the ownership of a car or a 
building . . . . A share of stock is a financial instrument, more akin to a bond than to a car or a 
building."139  This leads the authors to the economic argument that has been well known since 
Berle and Means, i.e., the owner does not have direct control over the corporation the way he 
or she would over an automobile or building: "The owner of the building . . . is an individual . 
. . in a position to have full knowledge . . . . generally views the property or business as a 
complete entity . . . . In contrast, the shareholder of the large public corporation is one of a 
far-flung, diverse, and ever-changing group."140  The authors then jump back to the fiduciary 
duties argument without really saying anything more about ownership: what the shareholders 
have is an "interest . . . in a financial return . . . the legal system allows them to act purely in 
                                               
136  "Corporate property is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person; its shareholders have only 
an indirect interest in the assets and business." James D. Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, CORPORATIONS 
§ 7.2 (2002);"When a corporation acquires property the title vests in it as a legal person distinct from 
its shareholders." Henry Winthrop Ballantine, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 119 (1946). 
137  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 72 et seq.  
138  It also should be noted that shareholders' ownership is usually discussed at a political economic level, 
where one rarely finds attempts to specify exactly what kind of property rights a share of stock conveys. 
This runs throughout prominent literature from Berle & Means, supra note 5, at 247 ("Conceived 
originally as a quasi-partner, manager and entrepreneur, with definite rights in and to property used in 
the enterprise and to the profits of that enterprise as they accrued, he has now reached an entirely 
different status. . . . He becomes simply a supplier of capital on terms less  definite than those 
customarily given or demanded by bondholders; and the thinking about his position must be qualified 
by the realization that he is, in a highly modified sense, not dissimilar in kind from the bondholder or 
lender of money."), and occasionally becomes rather specific, such as in Monks & Minow, supra note 
75, at 99 ("Stockholders, for example, are deemed to 'own' the company in which they invest.  But a 
share of stock does not translate into a specific segment of the company's assets, at l east not until the 
company dissolves and there is something left over after the creditors get what they are owed.").  
139  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 72. 
140  Id., at 73. 
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their self-interest. They are not fiduciaries and they do not owe duties to the corporation."141  
Their conclusion is that increasing shareholder voice would "change the nature of the 
ownership of shares of a public corporation in fundamental and unhealthy ways."142 
The fact that shareholders do not own a corporation's assets has little to say about 
whether shareholders own the corporation itself.  As the Delaware Court of Chancery has 
explained, "[a] certificate of stock is evidence of ownership, in the nature of a chose in 
action."143  A "chose in action" is "a proprietary right in personam."144  A shareholder has 
non-possessory interests in the corporation, which, drawing analogically from to rights in real 
property,145 consist of at least "profits"146 and a pro rata "remainder" in the corporate 
assets.147  Referring to Farwell J.'s classic definition of a share of stock in Borland's Trustee v. 
Steel,148 Prof. Paul Davies observes: 
The company itself is treated not merely as a person, the subject of rights and 
duties, but also as a res, the object of rights and duties.  It is the fact that the 
shareholder has rights in the company as well as against it, which, in legal theory, 
distinguishes the member from the debenture-holder whose rights are also defined 
by contract . . . but are rights against the company and, if the debenture is 
secured, in its property, but never in the company itself.149  
This does not mean that the share of stock conveys "an individual right in specific property," 
for it does not.150  However, the property right certificated by a share of stock is no less a 
                                               
141  Id., at 73. 
142  Id., at 74. 
143  Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54 (Del.Ch. 1949) See also Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 
540, 546 (Arizona S.Ct. 1915); Barksdale & als. v. Finney & als., 55 Va. 338 (Virginia S.Ct. 1858).  
This would also apply to a stock option, as the California Court of Appeals has recently explained: " An 
employee stock option grant is thus "'not an expectancy but a chose in action, a form of property . . .' 
susceptible of division in spite of being contingent or not having vested."" In re Marriage of Margaret 
and Grant Palin, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4318, January 31, 2002. 
144  B. Garner, ed., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234, (7th ed. 1999). 
145  One of the reasons why the "more exotic interests" in personal – as opposed to real – property are 
rarely discussed is because "virtually anyone who wants to create complicated future interests in 
personal property . . . does so through a trust."  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 3, 18 (2000). 
146  Ballantine, supra note 136, at 375; H. Henn/J. Alexander, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 396 (1983); Clark, supra note 103, at 13. 
147  Ballantine, supra note 136, at 375; Henn/Alexander, supra note 139, at 396; Clark, supra note 103, at 
13. 
148  Borland's Trustee v. Steel [1901] 1 Ch. 279 at 288. 
149  PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 616-17 (7th ed. 2003). 
150  Ballantine, supra note 136, at 289. 
Nomination of Directors under U.S. and German Law 
Draft: December 17, 2004 
 
- 28 - 
property right because it does not vest in specific assets, just as the property right in a share 
of stock does not disappear merely because the shareholder has only a pro rata property 
interest in all shares of the same type that are held in fungible bulk by his or her broker.151  
When a corporation is dissolved, shareholders have a right to assets remaining after claims are 
settled pursuant to law (§ 281 Del. Gen. Corp. Law), and these rights "run with the assets,"152 
allowing an action for recovery of the property if such assets are unjustly transferred to 
another class of shareholders.153  The generally accepted truism that shareholders "own" 
corporations is not a myth. 
Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum next set out to refute the approach of corporate 
governance that seeks to address "agency problems": "Just as the analogy of the shareholder 
as property owner is flawed, so too is the principal-agent analogy."154  As discussed above, 
the legal concept of agency cannot be strictly applied to corporate governance, as 
shareholders have no right to issue instructions to managers.155  However, the near universal 
employment of the term "agency" in corporate governance literature does not refer to a legal, 
but rather to an economic concept.156  In any case, the argument offered by Messrs. Lipton 
                                               
151  See § 8-503(b) Uniform Commercial Code: "An entitlement holder's property interest with res pect to a 
particular financial asset . . . is a pro rata property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by 
the securities intermediary, without regard to the time the entitlement holder acquired the security 
entitlement or the time the securities intermediary acquired the interest in that financial asset."  
152  "For our purposes, the attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract right is that a 
property right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other 
persons to whom possession of the asset, or other rights in the asset, are subsequently transferred. In 
the parlance of property law, the burden of a property right “runs with the asset.”" H. Hansmann/R. 
Kraakman, "Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerus Clauses Problem and the Divisibilty of 
Rights," Harvard Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 037 (2002), at 5, available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=323301.  
153  Mohawk Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Delaware Rayon Co. , 110 A.2d 305 (Del. Ch. 1954).  Another 
interesting case involving the property rights attaching to shares is the right of a shareholder to 
separate dividend rights from a share when it is sold in close proximity to the annual meeting at which 
dividends will be declared, thereby causing the profit rights accruing to a share of stock purchased ex 
dividend spring back only after such immediately succeeding declaration, and certainly giving the 
original shareholder an actionable right against any subsequent purchaser who happens to erroneously 
receive the dividends declared at such meeting. 
154  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 75. 
155  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
156  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 104, at 87 ("The problem of inducing an 'agent' to behave as if he 
were maximizing the 'principal's' welfare is quite general.  It exists in all organizations and in all 
cooperative efforts – at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in 
cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships actually called 
'agency relationships,' such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate.").  
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and Rosenblum does not go to either the legal or the economic meaning of the term "agency", 
but rather presents a kind of anecdotal, practical observation: 
In the principal-agent model, the principal is typically a sole owner, with direct 
knowledge of and interest in a property, who selects and monitors an agent to 
manage the property. . . . the shareholder in the public corporation is part of a 
wide and ever-changing body . . . . managers will have been involved with the 
corporation far longer than the vast majority of the shareholders . . . . 
shareholders buy and sell shared financial interests in an on-going business 
enterprise.157 
This analysis does not address the legal position of either shareholders or managers, but looks 
very much like an optimistic re-evaluation of the state of affairs that Berle and Means found 
so discouraging.158  By stressing market liquidity and shareholder exit, the argument also begs 
the question why more shareholders do not choose to stay with a corporation and change it 
when it under-performs, rather than following the Wall Street Rule.159  As Prof. Albert 
Hirschman has pointed out, the frequency of a member's exit from an organization tends to 
increase in direct proportion to the cost and ineffectiveness of voice.160 Messrs. Lipton and 
Rosenblum do not go into this issue, but rather turn to why shareholder voice is both 
                                               
157  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 75. 
158  "Outwardly the change is simple enough.  Men are less likely to own the physical instruments of 
production.  They are more likely to own pieces of paper, loosely known as stocks, bonds, and other 
securities, which have become mobile through the machinery of the public markets.  Beneath this, 
however, lies a more fundamental shift.  Physical control over the instruments of production has been 
surrendered in ever growing degree to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, supposedly, 
but by no means necessarily, for the benefit of the security holders." Berle & Means, supra note 1, at 8.  
A similar re-evaluation of these observations can be found in another managerialist, Dean Bayless 
Manning. See Bayless Manning, Review of The American Stockholder , 67 Yale L.R. 1477, 1489 
(1958) ("Thanks to the pioneering work of Berle . . . we have long known that in our modern industrial 
system . . . . today's large corporations may for many purposes be best viewed as an intricate, 
centralized, economic-administrative structure run by professional managers who hire capital from the 
investor."). 
159  The "Wall Street Rule" was defined in the SEC's 1971 "Institutional Investor Study Report": 
"[I]nstitutions tend to vote with management on questions put to a shareholder vote and . . . if they lose 
confidence in management they tend to sell their holdings in a company rather then to attempt to 
control or influence management decisions. This conclusion appears attributable to two factors. First, 
institutions are inclined to believe that their responsibility is to mak e investment decisions rather than 
to attempt to influence management decisions. Second, while there are no statutory restrictions upon 
the right of institutions to attempt to influence management decisions, institutions tend to believe that 
an effort to do so would be inappropriate and would subject them to criticism. . . . In general, it can be 
concluded that even where institutions have the potential power to influence management decisions 
they tend to be reluctant to exercise this power, particularly in  an open and public way." Cited in JAMES 
E. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 41 (1987). 
160  "[T]he decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of 
voice" (emphasis in original) A. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 37 (1970). 
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unnecessary and disruptive, given the fiduciary duties and general psychological make-up of 
management. 
In what might be called a "behavioral" argument, Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum 
explain, no doubt based on their vast experience as counsel to many of the world's leading 
corporations, the character and required working conditions of directors:  "The best 
candidates for director typically do not need the job. . . . Rather, they serve for the challenge . 
. . . the best candidates do not need to be constrained or disciplined."161  Indeed, "[r]eplacing 
a chief executive officer or other senior executive . . . . can be disruptive to the corporation . . 
. In order for a board to perform its adversary role effectively, there must be a level of mutual 
respect and trust . . . . When the executives view directors as being 'on the same side' . . . the 
executives are likely to volunteer more and better information."162  As a result, if shareholder 
nominated directors were to seek to monitor the activities of management rather than helping 
out with nurturing trust, they would be "viewed as adversaries rather than partners, [and] the 
relationship between the board and the management can also break down."163  The productive 
tranquility and ambiance of trust would also be damaged if directors were forced to compete 
with shareholder candidates for their seats.  Such elections would "reintroduce the kind of 
adversarial relationships spawned by the hostile takeover era."164  This is because "[s]eeking 
to replace one or more directors on a company's board is an intrinsically adversarial act, and 
companies and boards that find themselves subject to election contests react to it as such."165  
This argument seems both to underestimate "how strongly the dark force of fraud can pull on 
the heart of man,"166 and to ignore the fact that even free negations to reach cooperative 
equilibriums take place "in the shadow of the law."167  That is, if the law were to increase 
                                               
161  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 86.  Also, "directors and managers of public corporations . . . 
measure their success in terms of the success of the corporations they direct and manage. . . . 
Regardless of the compensation package, no director or manager wants to see the corporation he or she 
runs fail to succeed and thrive.  Managers do not need to be 'disciplined'." Id. at 76. 
162  Id., at 80. 
163  Id., at 82. 
164  Id., at 85. 
165  Id., at 85. 
166  Clark, supra note 103, at 113. 
167  See Remarks of Prof. John Coffee in Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 56, at 98. 
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shareholder voice, management would eventually stop posing with suspicious resentment and 
settle down to work on the basis of the new balance of power.168 
The authors also raise the arguments that institutional investors are not suited for 
performing monitoring activity,169 which is a point one finds often raised by persons who 
speak from the perspective of such investors.170  However, exactly because institutional 
investors are not in the business of sitting on corporate boards, they would likely choose their 
candidates out of the pool of independent directors that has developing since the 1970s.  This 
would combine the strengths of independent directors with the flexibility of shareholder 
appointment and removal, and thus each of the two governance mechanisms would work to 
support and facilitate the effectiveness of the other. 
Like many other commentators, Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum also argue that the 
reforms surrounding the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 should be allowed to work their effects 
before additional measures are introduced.171  The interesting thing about this argument is 
that attempts to characterize the Security Holder Nominations Proposal as a measure that is 
separate from other measures adopted in reaction to the scandals that prompted the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, although it harks back to an idea that the SEC seriously discussed in 1942 and 
1977, and was issued in proposal form roughly simultaneous to a number of other measures 
in 2003; moreover the SEC makes express reference to the recent scandals in its proposing 
release.172  This argument has been raised by a number of commentators,173 but is not 
supported by any discernable end to the reforms that began in 2002.  Strategically, the 
                                               
168  The mere fact that the Security Holder Nominations Proposal was pending during the 2004 proxy 
season appears to have made management considerably more open to hearing and addressing 
shareholders' attempts at pre-annual meeting negotiations. See Institutional Shareholder Services, 
supra note [·], at 7 et seq. 
169  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 77. 
170  See Pozen, supra note 4, at 96 et seq. 
171  Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 119, at 90 et seq. 
172  "Reflecting concern over corporate scandals and the accountability of corporate directors, many 
commenters urged the Commission to adopt rules that would provide security holders with greater 
access to the nomination process and the ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities as owners 
of their companies." Security Holder Nominations Proposal supra note 15, at 60784. 
173  A few of the commentators who used this argument are: Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra 
note 44, at 119; Comments of Congressman Gerald W. Hocker, Delaware State Representative, 38th 
District, U.S. House of Representatives, December 19, 2003; Comments of Stephen F. Gates, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, ConocoPhillips, December 19, 2003; Comments of Henry A. 
McKinnell, Ph.D., Chairman of the Board and CEO, Pfizer Inc.; Chairman, The Business Roundtable, 
December 22, 2003.  The above comments are available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml. 
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argument plays to short public memory, and to the fact that public support for regulatory 
measures is strongest immediately after investments have been lost, but then quickly wanes.174  
The argument is premature.  Indeed, corporate governance problems and scandals still filled 
the headlines of daily newspapers in 2004.175 
IV. THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS IN GERMAN STOCK 
CORPORATIONS 
A. The Composition of the Board under German Law 
Although Germany, like the United States, has a federal system, all relevant corporate 
and securities laws are federal.176  This means that the German corporate governance system 
has not to date suffered from the types of potential overlaps, conflicts and gaps between state 
and federal law discussed above with regard to U.S. Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 and proposed 
Rule 14a-11.177  In addition, although German federal corporate and securities law has been 
substantially shaped by European Community Directives, such Directives are implemented 
through national legislation and thus corporations usually are not forced to comply with 
different sets of law at the national and European levels.178  This will soon change if the 
European Stock Corporation (Societas Europaea) form, which entered into existence on 
October 8, 2004,179 is much used.  The Societas Europaea is governed by the general 
                                               
174  Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence , 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 
849, 850 (1997). 
175  See, e.g., A. Galloni et al., "Big U.S. Firms Face Parmalat Charges," Wall Street Journal Europe, p. 1, 
March 19, 2004; C. Cummins, "Shell's Top Executives Kept Board in Dark on Reserves," Wall Street 
Journal Europe p. 1, March 10, 2004; B. Orwall et al., "Eisner Gives up a Disney Post," Wall Street 
Journal Europe, p. A5, March 5, 2004; M. Walker, "Germany Awaits Mannesmann Trial", Wall Street 
Journal Europe, p. 1, January 19, 2004; S. Ascarelli/J. Lubin, "Adecco Delays '03 Results, Prompting 
Fear of Scandal," Wall Street Journal Europe, p. 1, January 13 2004; A. Galloni et al., "Parmalat 
Fraud May Top € 7 Billion, Prosecutors Say," Wall Street Journal Europe, p. 1, December 24, 2003. 
176  The primary corporate law statutes in Germany are the Stock Corporation Act ( Aktiengesetz), which 
provides a relatively inflexible system of rules for larger companies with transferable shares, the 
Reorganization Act (Umwandlungsgesetz), which regulates mergers and changes in corporate form, 
and the Limited Liability Company Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung), 
which provides a flexible system of rules for closely held corporations.  The primary securities laws are 
the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), the Exchange Act (Börsengesetz), the Securities 
Prospectus Act (Verkaufsprospektgesetz), and the Securities Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 
(Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz). 
177  See Part II.A. 
178  With the exception of the Limited Liability Company Act, all of the federal laws listed in note 176, 
supra, have been significantly shaped by EC Directives. 
179  See Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company 
(SE). Unlike Directives, Regulations have direct effect in EC Member States, and need not be 
implemented through national legislation. See Article 249 (previously 189), Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("A regulation shall have general application. It 
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framework of directly applicable supranational law (a European Regulation), which leaves 
gaps in areas in sensitive or difficult to harmonize areas (such as directors' fiduciary duties), 
for national law to fill in.180  This will introduce problems of "federalism" in Germany as well. 
It is also very important to note that, unlike under the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which gives incorporators substantial leeway to configure their corporation,181 the 
German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz or "AktG") is composed primarily of 
mandatory provisions, which means that a corporate charter may not deviate from such 
provisions unless expressly permitted by law.182  This mandatory nature of German corporate 
law creates a significant body of control and protection mechanisms that make German 
corporations somewhat inflexible, but lend their governance systems significant uniformity. 
Under the Aktiengesetz, a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft or "AG") has a two-
tier board.183  The two levels are the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) (§§ 95—116 AktG) 
and the management board (Vorstand) (§§ 76—94 AktG).  This system resembles to some 
extent the governance structure found in U.S. listed companies, in which audit, nomination, 
and compensation committees composed of independent directors perform special tasks with 
a focus on monitoring.184  A significant difference, however, lies in the way the board 
members are appointed.  In an AG, shareholders elect all or some of the monitoring directors, 
who are seated on the supervisory board (§ 101(1) AktG), and the supervisory board in turn 
appoints the "managing" directors (§ 84(1) AktG), who make up the management board, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
shall be binding in its entirety and directly appli cable in all Member States.").  It is still unclear to 
what extent the European Stock Corporation will be used.  Another supranational entity, a kind of 
transnational partnership called the European Economic Interest Grouping, has only been sparsely 
employed.  See Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
180  See SE Regulation, supra note 179, Art. 9. 
181  See, for example, § 141(a) Del. Gen. Corp. Law, which allows all of the powers and duties of the board 
to be "exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the 
certificate of incorporation." 
182  "The charter may deviate from the provisions of this Act only if expressly allowed."(§  23(5) AktG). 
183  See Theodore Baums, "Company Law Reform in Germany," Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 
Institute for Banking Law, Working Paper No. 100 (2002), available at http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/baums/, and Klaus Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board (Aufsichtsrat): A German View on 
Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy 
Wymeersch, eds., 1997).  It should be noted that under the SE Regulation, it is possible for an SE 
based in Germany to use a single-tier board. See SE Regulation, supra note 179, Art. 38(b). 
184  See New York Stock Exchange, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 303.01 (Audit Committee), § 303A.04 
(Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee), and §  303A.05 (Compensation Committee), available 
at www.nyse.com/. This similarity is also discussed in Kraakman, supra note 29, at 40. 
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have direct responsibility for managing the company (§ 76(1) AktG).  Another complication 
enters through the representation of the company's employees and their labor unions on the 
supervisory board, referred to as "co-determination".  In an AG with more than 2,000 
employees, half of the seats on the supervisory board are filled by labor representatives,185 
part of which are directly elected by the employees and part of which are appointed by the 
labor unions that are active in the company.186  The purpose of co-determination is to give a 
particular group of stakeholders – the company's employees – a significant influence over the 
company's policy and management;187 the causes for co-determination are complex,188 and its 
effectiveness is much debated, especially at the current time in Germany.189 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand the effects of co-
determination on the shareholders' ability to influence the appointment of management.  As 
said, the supervisory board of a stock corporation appoints the members of the management 
board, and if the corporation has more than 2,000 employees, one half of the supervisory 
board will be composed of labor representatives.  Section 31(2) of the Co-Determination Act 
provides that the supervisory board appoints the management board members following a 
                                               
185  The Co-Determination Act of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, or "MitbestG") applies to limited liability 
companies and AGs with more than 2,000 employees (see § 1 MitbestG), and requires that one-half of 
the supervisory board comprise representatives of the employees and their unions (see § 7 MitbestG).  
See Bernt Gach, Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeiter, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR 
AKTIENGESETZ Vol 3, 1301 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler, ed., 2004); Theodor Baums & Bernd 
Frick, The Market Value of the Codetermined Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 206 
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe, eds., 1999).  The Works Constitution Act of 1952 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) requires that a company have a supervisory board and that one-third of the 
board members be appointed by employees if the corporation employs more than 500 persons.  
186  The Co-Determination Act specifies the size of the supervisory board, which varies from 12 members 
for companies with no more than 10,000 employees, 16 members for companies with no more than 
20,000 employees, up to 20 members for companies with more than 20,000 employees (§ 7(1), 
MitbestG). Companies with a supervisory board of 12 members, would have six shareholder 
representatives, four employee representatives, and two union representatives; companies with a 
supervisory board of 16 members, would have eight shareholder representatives, six employee 
representatives, and two union representatives; companies with a supervisory board of 20 members, 
would have 10 shareholder representatives, seven employee representatives, and three union 
representatives (§ 7(2), MitbestG). 
187  It is often discussed, and some authors have called it "the most remarkable experiment in corporate 
governance of the post-War period." Kraakman, supra note 29, at 62. 
188  See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 (2003) and Katharina 
Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalit ies, in Blair & Roe, supra 
note 185. 
189  See Neue Vorschläge zur Mitbestimmung ("New Recommendations on Co-Determination"), DAS 
HANDELSBLATT, Nov. 12, 2004 and EU greift deutsche Mitbestimmung an ("The EU Attacks German 
Co-Determination"), DAS HANDELSBLATT, Nov. 12, 2004. The newspaper DAS HANDELSBLATT is 
available at http://www.handelsblatt.com. 
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specific procedure that begins with a two-thirds majority requirement for appointment on a 
first ballot, but has a waterfall structure that provides, in § 31(3), that if the two-thirds 
majority is not achieved, a new vote must be taken and approved by a simple majority, and 
§ 31(4) provides that if that majority is not reached, then the chairman of the supervisory 
board has a tie-breaking vote in reaching a simple majority.190  The chairman is elected 
according to a similar waterfall of decreasing majorities that allow the shareholder 
representatives to fill this slot.191  As a result, the labor representatives can filibuster against 
election of shareholder representative candidates,192 but they can only slow down and not 
stop the shareholder representatives from electing the entire management board.193 
The election of supervisory board members usually takes place at the annual meeting 
(§ 101(1), 124(2) AktG). The terms of supervisory board members can be as long as five 
years (measured as four years from the first annual meeting that reviews the member for 
approval, § 102(1) AktG),194 but either the charter or the shareholder resolution electing a 
given member may specify a shorter period.195  As a result, staggered boards are possible.196  
                                               
190  See Gach, supra note 185, at 1423-1429, and Hans-Joachim Mertens, Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat, 
in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 786-789 (Wolfgang Zöllner, ed., 1996). 
191  Pursuant to § 27(1) of the Co-Determination Act, the supervisory board of a corporation to which the 
Act applies must have a chairman who is elected by the vote of ⅔ of the entire supervisory board. If the 
required ⅔ majority is not attained, § 27(2) provides that the board members representing the 
shareholders elect the chairman by a simple majority of votes cast and the labor representatives elect 
the vice chairman by a simple majority of votes cast.  See Gach, supra note 185, at 1410-1415, and 
Mertens, supra note 190, at 774-779. 
192  See Hopt, supra note 183, at 4-5.  Following the first ballot, a "mediation committee" 
(Vermittlungsausschuss) has one month to propose new candidates.  Other candidates for the second 
ballot may also be proposed, but the full period of one month must expire before the second ballot may 
take place. See Mertens, supra note 190, at 787 and Gach, supra note 185, at 1426-1427. 
193  It was this ability of the shareholders to ultimately control the appointment of the corporation’s 
managing directors that kept the German Constitutional Court ( Verfassungsgericht) from striking 
down the Co-Determination Act 1976 as an unjust taking of private property in violation of the 
protections set forth in Article 14 of the German Federal Constitution (the court’s decision may be 
found in volume 50 of the Constitutional Court Reporter, BVerfGE 50, at page 290).  See also 
Mertens, supra note 190, at 679.  It appears that Prof. Kraakman and his fellow authors have stretched 
the ability of labor representatives to delay an appointment into an absolute right to veto.  See 
Kraakman, supra note 29, at 63 ("Nevertheless, employee representatives are by no means powerless 
since they retain a veto over the appointment (and reappointment) of the management board.")  This is, 
as discussed above, incorrect. It regretfully tends to skew the book's analysis of shareholder rights in 
Germany, because it assumes that employee representatives can block shareholder appointment of 
management through their representatives in the management board.  
194  Either the charter or the shareholder resolution electing a member may specify a shorter period.  See 
Johannes Semler, Comment to § 102 AktG, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 185, at marginal 
note 19. 
195  See Id., at marginal note 19. 
196  See Id. at marginal note 17. 
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Each year, shareholders have an opportunity at the annual meeting to approve or disapprove 
of the actions that both the supervisory and management boards have taken during the past 
fiscal year (§ 120 AktG).  A disapproval of a director's actions during the year amounts to a 
vote of no confidence against such director, and although it does not automatically remove 
the director from office or create liability, it does focus significant media attention on the 
relevant director and often raises a number of issues that later serve as the basis for a 
lawsuit.197  Shareholders may also remove the shareholder-appointed supervisory board 
members with or without cause (§ 103 AktG),198 although the high, required majority of ¾ of 
the votes cast results in such board members being removed rarely,199 perhaps as rarely as 
under § 141(k) Del. Gen. Corp. Law. 
B. The Nomination of Directors under German Law 
1. Nomination by the Supervisory Board 
As said, the members of the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders; 
shareholders' meetings, including the annual meeting, are as a rule called by the management 
board (§ 121(2) AktG).  The supervisory board is required to draft a slate of candidates and 
the management board must distribute it with the call to meeting (§ 124 AktG).  The 
procedure used to call the meeting and inform the shareholders is provided for in detail in the 
Stock Corporation Act. The management board must call a meeting at least one month in 
advance (§ 123(1) AktG) by publishing the call to meeting and the agenda – which includes 
the slate of candidates – in business newspapers (§ 124(1) AktG).  Since the beginning of 
2003, this duty is satisfied by placing the notice in a web-accessible, notice board segment of 
the German "federal register" (elektronischer Bundesanzeiger) (§ 25 AktG).200  Within 12 
days after giving this notice, the management board must dispatch copies of the call to 
meeting to the banks and shareholder organizations that exercised proxies in the last general 
meeting (§ 125(1) AktG), as well as to registered shareholders and to shareholders that have 
deposited bearer shares with the company or requested the materials (§ 125(3) AktG).201   
                                               
197  See Dietmar Kubis, Comment on § 120 AktG, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ Vol. 4, 
marginal notes 2, 24, 33-36. 
198  This requires ¾ of the votes cast pursuant to § 103(1) AktG.  The supervisory board may remove 
management board members for good cause (§ 84 AktG). 
199  See Baums, Takeovers v. Institutions in Germany, supra note 24, at 155-56. 
200  This notice board is found at https://www.ebundesanzeiger.de/research/banzservlet. 
201  The record date after which newly registered shareholders will not receive the call to meeting or the 
agenda is "two weeks" before the date of the meeting (§ 125(2) no. 3 AktG). 
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If supervisory board members are to be elected at the annual meeting, the notice of the 
call to meeting and agenda must contain a slate of nominees formulated by the supervisory 
board itself and relevant information about such nominees (§ 124(3) AktG).202  The proposed 
slate of nominees may be drafted by the entire supervisory board or a committee thereof, but 
it is not considered appropriate for the employee representative members of the supervisory 
board to take part in these deliberations.203  Just as in the United States,204 candidates may be 
nominated on the floor of the meeting,205 but because a great number of votes are cast by 
proxy, the proposed slate will largely dominate the outcome of the election.206 
2. Nomination by Shareholders 
Under German law, shareholders have a number of avenues for proposing matters to 
the annual meeting.  They may themselves demand that a meeting be called (§ 122(1) AktG), 
add items to the meeting agenda (§ 122(2) AktG), make proposals that supplement or oppose 
those of the management (§ 126 AktG), or propose nominees for election to the supervisory 
board (§ 127 AktG).  Although it has been remarked that shareholder proposals often involve 
social issues not directly related to the business of the company,207 the German corporate law 
literature does not complain that shareholder nominees exercise special interests or balkanize 
the supervisory board. 
Shareholders representing 5 % of an AG's capital may demand that the management 
board call a meeting (§ 122(1) AktG), and such demand will be enforced by a court (§ 122(4) 
AktG).  Unlike proposed Rule 14a-11, there is no duration requirement on the 5 % holding; it 
must merely exist at the time the demand is made,208 and need not be made personally by the 
shareholder, but may be exercised by anyone holding a power to represent the shareholder.209  
                                               
202  Section 124 contains certain requirements for supervisory boards affected by the Law on Co-
Determination for Enterprises Engaged in the Mining, Iron and Steel Industries of May 21, 1951 
(Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz) and the August 7, 1965 law that supplements this Act 
(Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz). Because almost no German companies are still governed by this 
law, I do not go into the details of its impact in this paper.  
203  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 124 AktG, at marginal note 48. 
204  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
205  J. Semler, supra note 185, Comment to § 101, at marginal note 16. 
206  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 124 AktG, at marginal note 42. 
207  See H-J. Mertens, Das Minderheitsrecht nach § 122 Abs. 2 AktG und seine Grenzen, 42 DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 481 (1997). 
208  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 122 AktG, at marginal note 7. 
209  Id., at marginal note 5. 
Nomination of Directors under U.S. and German Law 
Draft: December 17, 2004 
 
- 38 - 
Either together with a demand for a shareholders' meeting or in the context of an existing call 
to meeting, shareholders may demand that one or more items be placed on the meeting 
agenda if they either represent 5 % of the AG's corporate capital or have a holding with a par 
value of at least € 500,000 (§ 122(2) AktG), which sum would represent significantly less 
than a 5 % holding in a large, publicly traded company.210  Shareholders may make proposals 
with regard to the agenda items they demand.211  Again, there is no minimum holding period 
to be eligible for the demand right.212  All costs for the meeting and the preparation and 
distribution of the call to meeting, agenda and proposals are paid by the company (§ 122(4) 
AktG).213  Prof. Hans-Joachim Mertens noted in 1997 that shareholder use of § 122 to add 
items to the meeting agenda was on the increase.214  My research has yielded no more recent 
empirical evidence of this.  It may be useful with regard to the challenges that have been made 
to proposed Rule 14a-11,215 to note that the question of unequal treatment of shareholders, 
which is also generally forbidden in German corporate law,216 is not even raised in connection 
with the above rights, perhaps because such demand rights by minority shareholders are older 
than the Aktiengesetz itself.217 
In addition to this right of certain, larger shareholders or groups of shareholders to call 
general meetings and set the meeting agenda, all shareholders, regardless of the size or 
duration of their holding, have a right to propose candidates for election to the supervisory 
board (§ 127 AktG).  The shareholder may nominate either a full or a short slate of 
candidates.218  Although the management board is not required to publish or dispatch such 
proposal with the call to meeting, it must "make it available" to the shareholders, which is 
satisfied by placing the proposed nomination and any supporting statement of up to 5,000 
                                               
210  Id., at marginal note 28. 
211  Winfried Werner, Comment to § 122 in GROßKOMMENTAR AKTG marginal note 70 (Klaus Hopt & 
Herbert Wiedemann, eds., 4th ed., 1993). 
212  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 122 AktG, at marginal note 29. 
213  See Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 122 AktG, at marginal note 65, Werner, supra note 192, 
Comment to § 122, at marginal note 77 et seq. 
214  See Mertens, supra note 207, at 481. 
215  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
216  Section 53a of the Aktiengesetz provides: "Shareholders shall be treated equally under equal 
circumstances." 
217  This right has been part of German corporate law since the latter half of the 19 th century, when 
corporate law was still part of the Commercial Code.  See W. Werner, supra note 192, Comment to 
§ 122 AktG. 
218  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 127 AktG, at marginal note 4. 
Nomination of Directors under U.S. and German Law 
Draft: December 17, 2004 
 
- 39 - 
words on the company's website.219  Shareholder nominations take place through analogical 
application of a shareholder proposal rule, § 126 AktG,220 that resembles U.S. Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-8, and which like the U.S. rule contains a number of grounds on which the 
management board may refuse to make a proposal available.  Section 126 allows all 
shareholders to make proposals that either oppose221 or supplement management proposals, 
and allows management to exclude a proposal if it: 
· does not oppose, but merely repeats a proposal made by management (§ 126(2), 
no. 4 AktG); 
· could subject the management board to prosecution for making it known 
(§ 126(2), no. 1 AktG); 
· violates the law or the charter (§ 126(2), no. 2 AktG); 
· is materially false or misleading (§ 126(2), no. 3 AktG); 
· has been repeatedly rejected in the past (§ 126(2), no. 5 AktG); 
· the shareholder does not plan to be present or represented at the meeting where it 
will be considered (§ 126(2), no. 6 AktG); or 
· the shareholder has failed to support one of his or her proposals at the last, two 
meetings (§ 126(2), no. 7 AktG). 
The ground for exclusion that would be likely to apply most often to a shareholder 
nomination is that expressed in § 126(2), no. 2 AktG, given that the law provides specific 
requirements for eligibility of a supervisory board member.222  Existing figures on such 
shareholder nominations show a relatively low rate of success.223  However, despite the fact 
that no shareholder eligibility requirements serve to screen out either opposing proposals or 
shareholder nominations, no significant disruption or balkanization of German corporate 
governance has been noticeably reported as a consequence of such shareholder rights. 
                                               
219  Id., at marginal note 1, and Comment to §  126, marginal note 21.  This resembles the use of "increased 
communications capabilities" that th e ABA Task Force on Shareholder Proposals recommends as 
Alternative II in its Report.  See Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra note 44, at 122 et seq. 
220  See generally, U. Noack, Das neue Recht der Gegenanträge nach § 126 AktG , 1393 Betriebs-Berater 
(2003). 
221  This offers an interesting opportunity for comparison to Rule 14a-8, which allows a proposal to be 
excluded if it does conflict with a management proposal. See 17 CFR § 240.14a-8(i)(9). 
222  Kubis, supra note 197, Comment to § 127, marginal note 8.  A member of the supervisory board may 
not simultaneously sit on the management board (§ 105(1) AktG), and must fulfill other requirement 
listed in § 101 AktG. 
223  See Theodor Baums & Christian Fraune, Institutionelle Anleger und Publikumsgesellschaft , DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 97 (1995), at 110, Table 18. 
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In January 2004, the German government introduced a draft bill for "Business Integrity 
and Modernization of Shareholder Actions" (Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts or "UMAG").224  Article 6 UMAG would allow 
shareholders freely to canvas each other seeking support for a given action or proposal in the 
notice board of the German "federal register" discussed above.  This option resembles what 
the SEC has proposed for the Security Holder Nominations Proposal combined with the ABA 
Task Force on Shareholder Proposals' recommendations regarding expanded use of new 
information technology.225  The creation of such an electronic area for SEC registered 
companies – perhaps in the context of the EDGAR system,226 using mandatory templates for 
the information posted, so as to standardize the content and format of notices and responses – 
could increase shareholder communication and coordination by reducing costs while 
eliminating some of the risks of free-wheeling internet correspondence. 
3. Voting through Bank Proxies 
The supervisory board members who represent shareholders are elected with a simple 
majority of the votes cast unless the charter provides for a higher majority (§ 133(1) AktG). 
Most votes in large companies are cast by proxy.227  As explained above, at the beginning of 
the 20th century, German banks were accustomed to dipping into the voting power of their 
customers' shares to supplement their own block holdings.228  Even after written proxies were 
                                               
224  Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts , 
currently available from the German Ministry of Justice on its website at http://www.bmj.de/ under 
"Gesetzentwürfe" / "Corporate Governance".  As its name suggests ("Anfechtung" means "legal 
challenge"), this legislation has also been designed to bring shareholder actions up to date by 
strengthening them. See Art. 1, no. 14 UMAG.  Germany is also moving in the direction of U.S. law 
by making efforts to strengthen securities fraud actions.  In October 2004, the German government 
released a "discussion draft" of a Law to Strengthen Liability for False Capital Market In formation 
(Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarktinformationen – "KapInHaG"), which 
would have made directors personally liable for releasing false information to the capital market 
intentionally or because of gross negligence. See Art. 1, no. 3 KapInHaG.  Like the Security Holder 
Nomination Proposal, however, the efforts of the German government met significant resistance from 
industry trade groups, and the Government almost immediately withdrew the draft. See 
SÜDDEUTSCHEN ZEITUNG, Nov. 10, 2004, at 21. 
225  See supra note 99 and accompanying text, as well as ABA Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, supra 
note 44, at 122 et seq. 
226  For those not familiar with EDGAR, it is the Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval System 
developed by the SEC in the 1990's, and used for the filing of disclosures required by law. See 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.  
227  See Barca & Becht, supra note 15, at 130, Table 5.1. 
228  See Tuerks, supra note 15, at 5 et seq. 
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required under the Aktiengesetz of 1937,229 banks still exercised de facto a significant amount 
of power over their customer's shares,230 even though they were under no legal obligation to 
exercise such votes.231  Like institutional investors in the United States, banks are generally 
believed to vote for management proposals, in particular for management nominees.232  
Following a reform initiative to replace bank voting with independent, competing proxy 
agents,233 the German legislature in 1997 took steps to reduce the influence that banks could 
exercise over the shares of beneficial owners held in their custody accounts,234 and in 2001, 
the German legislation reinforced the use of registered shares in Germany and sought to 
facilitate the exercise of votes attached to such shares.235  As a result, current law requires 
that banks disclose additional information regarding conflicts of interest in their exercise of 
voting rights, take steps to check any effects of such conflicts, and inform shareholders of 
other proxy agents that can legally exercise such rights.236  A bank must include in its financial 
statements a list of companies in which it either has a holding exceeding 5 % or to which it 
has elected a supervisory board member (§ 340a(4) HGB) and must notify its customers 
holding stock custody accounts if: 
· any of its managing directors or employees are members of the supervisory board of 
the company whose shares are to be voted, or if any employee or managing director 
of such company holds a seat in its own supervisory board (§ 128(2), sentence 6 
AktG); 
                                               
229  See Hommelhoff, supra note 16, at 92, and Henning Schröer, Comment to § 135 in MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR, supra note 197, at marginal note 8. The requirement of written form has since been 
deleted from the law. Id. at marginal note 13. 
230  See Baums, supra note 21. 
231  For a discussion of why banks exercise the votes of their custody account holders, see Baums, 
Takeovers v. Institutions in Germany, supra note 21, at 158 et seq. and Baums, Vollmachtstimmrecht, 
supra note 21, at 12 et seq. 
232  See Baums/Fraune, supra note 204, at 109—111. 
233  See Theodore Baums & Philip von Randow, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance: The 
German Experience and a New Approach, in Aoki & Kim, supra note 18 at 435; and Theodore Baums 
& Philip von Randow, Der Markt für Stimmrechtsvertreter, in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 145 (1995). 
234  See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (Law for Monitoring and 
Transparency in Business Undertakings), November 6, 1997, German Federal Law Reporter (BGBl), 
No. 24, 786 et seq. 
235  See Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (Law Concerning 
Registered Shares and to Facilitate the Exercise of Voting Rights), January 18, 2001, German Federal 
Law Reporter (BGBl), No.1, 125 
236  The following discussion of the reforms brought about in 1997 relies on Knauer, supra note 19, at 81 et 
seq. 
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· it has a holding in the company that must be notified under the "creeping tender 
offer" rules of § 21 Securities Trading Act (§ 128(2) , sentence 7 AktG);237 and 
· it has been a member of an underwriting syndicate for a securities issue of such 
company during the last, five years (§ 128(2), sentence 7 AktG). 
The bank is bound by a fiduciary duty that it exercise the voting rights in the best 
interests of the shareholder (§ 128(2), sentence 3 AktG), and since 1997, banks have been 
required to take "organizational steps to ensure that interests arising in other business areas" 
of the bank do not influence voting, as well as to name the manager responsible for fulfilling 
such duty (§ 128(2), sentence 3 AktG).  Banks must facilitate voting by providing proxy 
forms in paper or electronically (§ 128(2), sentence 5 AktG).  They must also make proposals 
to shareholders and inform them that, in the absence of a returned proxy card, the bank will 
vote according to its proposals (§ 128(2), sentence 4 AktG).  To open up the field for 
competition from other agents, management must now, together with the call to meeting, 
inform the shareholders of their right to appoint a proxy agent – particularly a shareholder 
interest group – to vote their shares (§ 125(1) AktG).  In a reversal of earlier policy, the 2001 
reform introduced the possibility for the company itself to name a proxy agent that the 
shareholders may appoint (§ 134(3) AktG).  Banks may now hold a long-term proxy for their 
customers, but must inform them on an annual basis that they can revoke the proxy at any 
time (§ 135(2) AktG).  By contrast to U.S. law, even if a bank is the registered shareholder 
for shares it holds for a customer, it must have a proxy in order to exercise the voting rights 
of such shares (§ 135(7) AktG).  In the debate leading up to the adoption of the Registered 
Share Act, the German Ministry of Justice advocated very strongly that – given that today's 
technology allows replication and communication of shareholder data – the indirect holding 
system must not be permitted to destroy the value of registered shares by reducing the 
shareholder register to a couple of nominees and "street names".238 
                                               
237  Section 21 of the Securities Trading Act provides as follows: "(1) Any person who through acquisition, 
disposal, or in another manner reaches, exceeds or falls below one of the thresholds of 5 per cent, 10 
per cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent or 75 per cent of the voting rights of a listed company (person 
required to report), shall in conformance with § 22(1) and (3) promptly, and at the latest within seven 
calendar days, provide written notice of such reaching, exceeding, or falling below the specified 
thresholds to the company and to the Federal Agency, together with the amount of its proportion of 
voting rights, its address, and the date of the reaching, exceeding, or falling below.  The period for 
giving notice shall start from the time when the person required to report learns, or in view of the 
circumstances should have learnt that his or her share of voting rights reached, exceeded or fell below 
the specified thresholds." 
238  See remarks of Ulrich Seibert, Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Namensaktie, in DIE NAMENSAKTIE 11, 
31 (Rüdiger von Rosen & Werner G. Seifert, eds., 2000). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Legislative and regulatory initiatives regarding shareholder rights in the United States 
and Germany display complimentary movements.  The United States has grudgingly granted 
an increasing number of governance tools to shareholders, although the insights of Berle and 
Means circa 1932 still seem to dominate much of our discussion on shareholder rights.  
Germany, on the other hand, has made significant efforts to reign in the power of financial 
institutions, particularly their exercise of other people's shares, and promote enforcement 
through individual shareholder actions.  The two legal systems seem to be moving toward a 
similar constellation of shareholder rights, which could, at least in part, be caused by the 
uniform global business structures of institutional investors.  However, the complications of 
federalism seem to have significantly hampered U.S. efforts and the introduction of directly 
applicable European corporate law through the Societas Europaea could change the path of 
Germany's development. 
The SEC's Security Holder Nominations Proposal is the most recent U.S. attempt to 
empower shareholders, and would eliminate a federal block to an existing state law right.  
The SEC appears to have authority to issue the proposed Rule 14a-11 under § 14 of the 
Exchange Act.  The use of "withhold votes" as a trigger is questionable, however, given that 
it both distorts the intended, state law value of voting rights with a secondary, federal 
meaning and demeans the capability of shareholders to simply opt-in.  It is unlikely that the 
eligibility holding requirement violates the equal treatment of shares, given that similar 
thresholds have been used for many purposes in both state and federal law. 
Proponents of Rule 14a-11 make a convincing argument that the shareholders of U.S. 
corporations are currently unable to enforce management accountability.  Certain arguments 
against the Rule – that accountability is misplaced because shareholders do not own the 
corporation and management does not need monitoring – are without merit.  The existence of 
a deep body of case law articulating directors' fiduciary duties strongly supports continued 
board control of nominations.  Nevertheless, shareholders do have fiduciary duties, and if they 
were given a realistic opportunity to nominate candidates, the courts would eventually 
articulate doctrine outlining the fiduciary duties applicable to such nominations. 
A brief exposition of the German experience casts doubt on the predictions that the 
proposed Rule would cause disruptions and waste.  Germany has a very liberal system of 
shareholder proposals and nominations, yet this has led neither to an expensive overuse of 
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corporate assets nor to balkanized boards.  A controlled, electronic environment for 
shareholder communications, as recently established in Germany, would appear to have value 
for the effective use of proposed Rule 14a-11, at least as long as shareholder identities in the 
United States remain the sole knowledge of clearing agencies and their participants. 
Given the steady growth of sophisticated, institutional investors on the U.S. market, it 
would seem highly improbable that the rights of shareholders in U.S. corporations will remain 
at their currently symbolic level.  Even if the 2003 proposal for shareholder nomination of 
directors is defeated, it would be difficult to image the gradual increase in shareholder rights 
that has been evident for over 20 years to die out.  It would be a rare thing if a constituency 
as articulate and energetic as the financial services industry remained dormant in an area 
where their ownership well exceeds 50 %, especially because the private households whose 
rights they would be indirectly asserting hold a significant number of votes. 
I 
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